On 30 August 2024, an Airbus Helicopters AS350 returning to base at Armamar, Portugal, in daylight after a firefighting callout where no action was required was unintentionally flown into a river when attempting a descent to route along it contrary to standard procedures. The helicopter was destroyed and the five firefighter passengers were killed but the pilot survived with serious injuries. The accident was caused by the pilot’s loss of situational awareness within a context of wider operational noncompliance, normalisation of procedural deviance, and inadequate oversight by the helicopter operator, the contractor and state safety regulator.

On 6 November 2022 adverse weather delayed an ATR42 beginning its visual-only approach to Bukoba. When an approach was commenced, adequate visual reference was not maintained due to continued adverse weather. No corrective action was taken in response to three successive automated excessive descent rate alerts or the first officer’s calls to reduce descent rate. Although response did follow a ‘PULL UP’ warning, it was too late to prevent a high-energy impact with the surface of Lake Victoria close to the shoreline, and both pilots and 17 of the passengers were killed.

On 12 August 2024, an ATR 72-500 making a Category 1 ILS approach to Guernsey with thick fog breached an approach ban by continuing its descent below the applicable minimum altitude of 1,000 feet agl. The aircraft then continued below what would have been the applicable 200 feet agl Decision Altitude without visual reference. At around 70 feet agl, a go-around was called but not correctly commenced, and the aircraft passed close to an unseen mast north of the runway before it eventually climbed. In the absence of any visibility improvement, a diversion to Southampton then followed.

On 17 February 2025 a Mitsubishi (formerly Bombardier) CRJ-900LR was on final approach to Toronto International and touched down at a high rate of descent on the right main landing gear, which collapsed inwards. This caused the right wing to break from the fuselage, which then rolled inverted, detaching the tailplane. The fuselage slid for some distance before stopping, complicating the evacuation. A fuel-fed fire immediately ignited around the right wing/fuselage attachment point but all 80 occupants escaped, almost all using just two exits. There were only two serious injuries and 19 minor injuries.

On 12 January 2023, an Airbus A330-300 touched down at Amsterdam at night 11 metres short of the runway after the captain manually flew below the visual ILS glidepath indication once below minimum decision height. This happened without comment by the other two junior pilots. The undershoot was apparently not recognised by any of the pilots, and debris on the runway was only discovered two hours later. The crew were unfamiliar with the relatively short runway. It was concluded that having incorrectly perceived the overrun risk as greater than an undershoot, they had prioritised speed control over maintaining the glide path.

On 11 February 2022 an Airbus A320 making a visual approach to Guadeloupe at night was advised by ATC of a descent below the minimum safe altitude. This advisory came as the crew continued the approach after visual reference was temporarily lost. A repeat of this warning by ATC prompted crew recognition that the aircraft was low and off the required approach track. A go-around was initiated from 460 feet agl. The decision to attempt a visual approach in unsuitable circumstances and a delay in recognising the need for a go-around were found to have been symptomatic of poor tactical decision-making.

On 25 October 2022, a Boeing 777-300ER encountered deteriorating weather conditions after initiating a delayed arrival diversion from Singapore Changi to nearby Batam where four approaches were flown and a ‘MAYDAY Fuel’ declared before a landing was achieved. By this time, the fuel remaining was “significantly below final reserve” although the actual figure was not published in the Investigation Report. It was concluded that the delay in commencing the diversion and the inappropriate attempt to perform an autoland on RWY04 at Batam airport by the flight crew contributed to the potentially hazardous circumstances.

On 6 December 2019, a Boeing 737-800 below Decision Altitude on an ILS approach at Paris Orly was unexpectedly instructed to go-around in day VMC without explanation. The go around was mishandled and the aircraft began to descend after initially climbing which triggered EGPWS Warnings and controller alerting before recovery was achieved. It was suspected that surprise at the go-around and the early climbing turn required may have initiated the crew’s mismanagement of automated flight path control with further surprise leading to failure to revert to manual control when they no longer understood the automated system responses to their inputs.

On 18 October 2019, a Boeing 787-9 descending to 4,500 feet to join the ILS for runway 25R at Hong Kong at 15 nm from touchdown failed to establish on the localiser. The autopilot was disconnected and the aircraft manually positioned onto the localiser from the north, establishing at 12 nm with terrain proximity not sufficient to activate the EGPWS. It was found that the deviation was attributable to an anomaly in the aircraft type Autopilot Flight Director System, and a corresponding Alert Service Bulletin was issued by Boeing to replace the faulty system component.

On 22 November 2021, a Fokker F100 crew discovered as they neared their destination, Paraburdo, that the forecast weather was so inaccurate that instead of the anticipated benign conditions, a much lower cloud base prevailed. A delay in recognising the implications of initially unsuccessful approaches and difficulty in obtaining updated weather for diversion options resulted in a fourth approach being intentionally continued significantly below minima, albeit successfully. Relevant aircraft operator procedures were identified as inadequate.

On 22 April 2019, a Eurocopter-Kawasaki BK-117C-1 helicopter was being positioned for an aeromedical evacuation the following day when it was unintentionally flown into the sea at night. The three crew members were able to evacuate from the partially submerged aircraft before it sank. The accident was attributed to the single pilot’s loss of situational awareness due to loss of visual depth perception when using night vision goggles. The relevant aircraft operator procedures and the applicable regulatory requirements were both found be inadequate relative to the operational risk which the flight involved.

On 20 October 2021, the flight crew of a Bombardier CRJ1000 making a LNAV/VNAV approach at Nantes using Baro-VNAV minima read back an incorrect QNH which was not noticed by the controller. The crew then flew the approach approximately 530 feet below the procedure vertical profile which led to the MSAW system being activated and advised to the flight. The crew response was delayed until the controller had twice repeated the correct QNH after which the error was recognised and the vertical profile corrected. The investigation noted that neither the operator’s procedures nor aircraft instruments allowed straightforward crew detection of their error.

On 23 January 2020, a Bombardier CRJ700 making a HUD-supported manual Cat 3a ILS approach to Lyon Saint-Exupéry in freezing fog conditions deviated from the required flight path localiser and reached a minimum of 265 feet agl before a go around was initiated without initially being flown in accordance with standard procedures. The Captain involved was relatively new to type and had not previously flown such an approach in actual low visibility conditions. The Investigation was not able to determine exactly what contributed to the approach and initial go around being misflown but identified a number of possible contributors.

On 1 November 2021, a deHavilland DHC6-300 crew en-route to Fort Simpson realised that they had insufficient fuel on board to reach their intended destination and therefore decided to attempt a diversion to the nearest available airport at Fort Providence. As fuel available dwindled, one engine was shut down but after an inadvertent fuel tank selection, the initially intended diversion was no longer possible and a forced landing in a bog was successfully accomplished. The Training Captain involved had developed a habit of performing checklists silently and from memory after gaining all his professional pilot experience at the same operator.

On 4 March 2019, an Embraer 145 attempting to land off an ILS approach at Presque Isle in procedure-minima weather conditions flew an unsuccessful first approach and a second in similar conditions which ended in a crash landing abeam the intended landing runway substantially damaging the aircraft. The accident was attributed to the crew decision to continue below the applicable minima without acquiring the required visual reference and noted that the ILS localiser had not been aligned with the runway extended centreline and that a recent crew report of this fault had not been promptly passed to the same Operator.