

There is no recognised standard in aviation for defining a typical Safety Management System (SMS). So it has been necessary to adapt best practice from other industries in order to provide guidelines for those parts of the aviation industry that wish to implement a formal SMS.

SRG has drawn up a number of SMS Policy and Principles aimed at providing a simple SMS framework supported by clear definitions. The objective of this leaflet is to provide a common understanding of the revised SMS Policy and Principle guidelines. It should be noted that these guidelines cover a generic aviation industry SMS and certain components will be applicable only to particular sectors of the industry. Further detailed guidance has been developed for use within particular sections of the industry and this material will be subject to on-going review in the light of experience.



Guidance for Developing and Auditing a Formal Safety Management System

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SMS Components

- 1 The Policy and Principles (P&Ps) define the components of an organisation's SMS. These have been derived from the lessons learned from a wide variety of disastrous accidents where **management failures** were cited as a significant contributory cause (factors which made the accident more likely to occur). The P&Ps could be considered as a hazard checklist for identifying the potential risks of management failures causing or contributing to an accident; the adoption of an effective formal SMS could be considered as a risk reduction exercise to minimise such failures as far as is reasonably practicable.
 - It is **unlikely and probably undesirable** that an organisation should attempt to introduce a complete SMS in a short timescale, although definition of the organisation's SMS P&Ps, signed off by the Board, and senior managers' safety accountabilities should be the initial task. It is for the organisation to decide which components should have priority for introduction if training or new processes need to be developed. Obviously it is sensible to start with the simplest for the organisation to implement.
- 2 Common-sense is required in interpreting the P&Ps for application within an organisation because every organisation is different, as are their safety cultures. The following points must be borne in mind:
 - **Almost all activities or initiatives** to maintain or improve an organisation's safety performance can be accommodated under one or other of the P&P statements defined below.
 - **Not all will be applicable to every type of organisation.** On the other hand, additional policies and principles can be added to meet the specific needs or role of the organisation.
 - In development of an SMS designed to manage all of the risks associated with aircraft production, maintenance or operation, it needs to be constantly borne in mind that **the risks being managed are those associated with causing or contributing to an aircraft accident.** Health and Safety Risks should be managed under the Health and Safety Executive's specific guidelines and are outside the scope of the CAA's regulatory authority.
- 3 A formal SMS needs to be documented to ensure traceability, standardisation and communication - just as does a Quality Management System. Normal practice is to produce a Safety Management Manual promulgating an organisation's SMS P&Ps, senior managers' safety accountabilities and procedures derived from the P&Ps **that are common to the whole organisation.** Detailed local procedures in other documents can be cross-referenced from the manual or reside in local departmental SMS Manuals. Hence the Safety Management Manual is likely to be a thin document.

Documentation

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Use of this guidance

The following pages record the issues that are likely to be covered in a generic aviation industry Safety Management System - this could be considered to be a checklist. They are not in the form of P&P statements (the language must be owned by the organisation implementing an SMS). This list has been approved by the SRG Safety Steering Committee.

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SMS Policy Statements

Board level approved safety policy statements which are likely to cover some of the following issues:

- 1 A statement of intent about maintaining or improving current safety performance.
- 2 A statement of intent to minimise the risks of an accident occurring - probably with the 'as far as is reasonably practicable' caveat.
- 3 A statement of intent to implement an effective formal safety management system.
- 4 A statement about individual and management responsibility for safety performance.
- 5 A statement about the priority ascribed to flight safety relative to commercial, operational, environmental and working practice pressures.
- 6 A statement about compliance with safety standards and regulatory requirements.
- 7 A statement about ensuring sub-contractors meet company safety standards and requirements.

Notes:

Typical Safety Management Principles

Safety management principles define the components or scope of a Safety Management System.

- 1 Published safety accountabilities (where applicable) of managers and key staff/appointments.
- 2 Arrangements to conduct internal safety incident investigations and implement remedial action.
- 3 Arrangements for recording and monitoring the overall safety standards of the organisation (usually a record of significant safety incidents), if applicable.
- 4 Arrangements to report (internally and externally) the results of investigations and dissemination of the lessons learned.
- 5 Arrangements to carry out regular safety audits, reviews or surveys within the organisation and for ensuring that agreed actions are implemented.
- 6 Arrangements for ensuring staff are adequately trained and competent for the job they are required to do.
- 7 Supervision arrangements for early detection of deviations from intended practices or procedures that degrade safety.
- 8 Arrangements for monitoring any deterioration in performance of safety significant equipment or systems, if applicable.
- 9 Arrangements enabling staff to communicate significant safety concerns to the appropriate level of management for resolution.
- 10 Arrangements to identify and address potential risks arising from changes in operations, systems, procedures and staff associated with safety significant functions or activities.
- 11 Where applicable, arrangements for the conduct of formal safety assessment processes required for certification/approval and the standards used (e.g. JAR 25.1309, ARP 4761, ARP 4754, DO178B, local standards etc.)

Notes: