


A large iceberg floats in a dark blue sea under a dark sky. The visible tip of the iceberg is small and jagged, while the submerged part is much larger and more complex in shape, illustrating the concept of hidden risks or a safety case.

Safety case

for the

SASI CBA

A photograph of an iceberg floating in a dark blue sea under a dark sky. The visible tip of the iceberg is small and jagged, while the much larger, submerged part is visible below the water line. The text is overlaid on the image.

Overall objective

Find a/our way on how to proceed for the safety assessment of the SASI CBA

Ops Concept

An iceberg floating in a dark blue sea under a dark sky. The tip of the iceberg is above the water, while the much larger, jagged base is submerged. The text is overlaid on the image, with the title above the water and the rest of the content below the waterline.

How do we proceed?

Presentation by project (change) owner and questions audience

Referring to documents provided


What shall we obtain?

Scope


Justification

Safety Criteria

(part of) assumptions




Closed when CBA
Active





SASI CBA


Sub scenarios are built on combinations of MIL unit controlling in CBA and AF flying




Both TSAs active independently



One or the other TSA active




Allocated





Airspace status process

Referenced
Allocated



Example request LicuaAF to utilise SASI CBA





An iceberg floating in a dark blue sea under a dark sky. The visible tip of the iceberg is on the left, while the much larger, submerged part extends across the middle and right of the frame. The text is overlaid on the image.

Safety considerations

How do we proceed?

Use of a simple Excel sheet to trigger discussion

What shall we obtain?

Training requirements (backing evidence)

Identification differences before/after the change

Requirements for H,E,P, airspace

Identification of Regulatory, liability etc issues

(part of) assumptions

Environment of operations (initial description)

Identify interfaces

Major/minor change

Safety considerations

Environment description gap analysis								current operations	future operations [OCB- ORD]	Gap	impact on safety environment	training gap
1.	equipment	1.1	communication									
CHANGE		1.1.1	air-ground						need testing		related to the unpredictable performance and results to provide evidence	Training: Supervisors & ATCOs to be fully familiar with system architecture
			1.1.1.1	microwave link							redundancy level?	
			1.1.1.2	land line							redundancy level?	
			1.1.1.3	satellite					?			
			1.1.1.4	remote transmission					old data / new data			
			1.1.1.5	data-link								
			1.1.1.6	frequency								
			1.1.1.7	radio coverage					affected e.g. improved coordination?			
			1.1.1.8	HMI					new R/T and tel HMI			ATCOs to be fully familiar with HMI
CHANGE		1.1.2	ground-ground								related to the unpredictable performance and results to provide evidence	
			1.1.2.1	telephone					new system			
			1.1.2.2	HMI					new system			ATCOs to be fully familiar with HMI

Initial Safety Argument

An iceberg floating in a dark blue sea under a dark sky. The visible tip of the iceberg is small and jagged, while the much larger, submerged part is hidden below the water line, illustrating the concept of an initial safety argument where the visible part is just the tip of the iceberg.

How do we proceed?

Go through the SC structure argument per argument and identify potential evidence


Refine argumentation

What shall we obtain?

Identification Evidence (direct and backing) and related activities

Argumentation

(part of) assumptions



Arg 1
"SASI CBA"
Specified
to be acceptably
safe

Trustworthiness
(process,
Competencies etc..)

Strategy

Arg 1.1
Ops Concept
described

Arg 1.2
Differences with
current
Operations
described

Arg 1.3
Impact on the
Operational
Environment
identified


Arg 1.4
Functionalities
&
Performances
Specified

Ref to CBA
concept

Description of
differences

Procedures
Routes affected

Purpose type of
military exercises,
Acft types and
performances
and
requirements



Arg 2.1
"SASI CBA"
Design
Completeness

Trustworthiness
(process,
Competencies etc..)

Strategy

Arg 2.1.1
Boundaries of
The change are
identified

Arg 2.1.2
CONOPS
Described

Arg 2.1.3
Necessary H,P,E
Functional
Requirements
identified

Arg 2.1.4
Safety
Requirements/
Assumptions
Captured

Arg 2.1.5
Safety
Requirements are
Realistic

Ref to SASI CBA
Assessment Scope
e.g. mil sc for what
concerns operations
inside CBA

Ref CONOPS doc

Ref list of
Requirements
(includes training
requirements)

Mapping safety
requirements
(from specs) and design
Or assumptions

Explain why realistic

Arg 2.2
"SASI CBA"
Design
Correctness

Trustworthiness
(process,
Competencies etc..)

Strategy

Arg 2.2.1
Internal Coherency
is
verified

Arg 2.2.2
Normal Conditions
Behavior
verified

Desk top exercise
to verify FUA procedures
(in this environment)

Simulation of
activities until
activation/deactivation

```
graph TD; A["Arg 2.3  
\"SASI CBA\"  
Design  
Robustness"] --- B["Trustworthiness  
(process,  
Competencies etc..)"]; A --> C[/Strategy/]; C --> D["Arg 2.3.1  
Reaction to  
External Failures"]; C --> E["Arg 2.3.2  
Reaction to  
Abnormal  
Conditions"]; D --- F(("Reaction to e.g.  
equipment  
failure (within MEL)")); E --- G(("Reaction to weather  
Adverse condition,  
acft emergency"));
```

Arg 2.3
"SASI CBA"
Design
Robustness

Trustworthiness
(process,
Competencies etc..)

Strategy

Arg 2.3.1
Reaction to
External Failures

Reaction to e.g.
equipment
failure (within MEL)

Arg 2.3.2
Reaction to
Abnormal
Conditions

Reaction to weather
Adverse condition,
acft emergency

Arg 2.4
"SASI CBA"
Mitigation of
Internal Failures

Trustworthiness
(process,
Competencies etc..)

Strategy

Arg 2.4.1
All Hazards
identified


Arg 2.4.2
Hazards Severity
assessed

Arg 2.4.3
Hazards Causes
identified

Arg 2.4.4
Safety Requirements
Or Assumptions
Causes identified

Arg 2.4.5
Aggregated hazards
Risks

OHA



Arg 4
"SASI CBA"
Migration
to operational use
will be acceptably
safe

Trustworthiness
(process,
Competencies etc..)

Strategy

Arg 4.1
Hazards Migration
identified

Arg 4.2
Migration Plan
Developed

Arg 4.3
Mitigation
Measures
Identified

Arg 4.4
Contingency Plan
Developed
& Tested

Arg 4.5
Performance
verification

Hazards specific
to first time operations

Plan for more staff
Additional verifications

Describe measures to
Be taken in case
identified events take
place

e.g. plan to
stop operations

Arg 5
"SASI"
On going operation
and Maintenance
will be acceptably
safe

Strategy

Arg 5.1
Reporting
Procedures

Arg 5.2
Remedial Actions
Procedures

Arg 5.3
Surveys Procedures

Ref to SMS
Ref to agreements

Ad-hoc measures
(provisions for
such measures)

Provisions for such
techniques and for
which purpose

Safety Plan

An iceberg floating in a dark blue sea under a dark sky. The visible tip of the iceberg is on the left, while the much larger, submerged part extends across the middle and right of the frame. The text is overlaid on the image.

How do we proceed?

From the findings of the presentation of the Ops Concept, the Safety Consideration report and Initial Safety Argument identify argument per argument the activities required to produce both evidence (safety assessments) and the SC itself

What shall we obtain?

A work plan detailing activities and responsibilities from which a PMP can be derived

Safety Plan

Item number	Safety case argument reference	Evidence/reference to be provided/produced	Person/team responsible	Technical content verification	Target date for completion
0	<u>Preamble</u>		Project Manager	Project Team	
1	Justification Reason for implementing the change.		Project Manager	Project Team	
2	Context May include a statement which limits the scope of an Argument in some way.		Project Manager	Project Team	
3	Operational concept What is required: Users' needs, high level requirements, scope		Project Manager	Project team	
4	CONOPS How system will be used		Ops department and TECH department in cooperation with project management team	Project team	
5	Safety criteria Rationale for using relative or quantitative criteria and AFARP		Project manager (Support Safety department)	Project team	
6	Assumptions Statements made a priori that will have to be demonstrated		Project Manager	OPS and TECH departments	

An iceberg floating in the ocean. The tip of the iceberg is visible above the water line, while the much larger, submerged part is below the surface. The text of the slide is overlaid on the image.

From there on...

1. Organise for resources

- **Preparer**
- **Contributors**
- **Support from Safety Department**

2. Finalise the Safety Plan (Preparer)

- **Identify documents exact references**
- **Identify activities to be planned (e.g. OHA/PSSA)**
- **Allocate work**
- **Find tentative target dates**

3. Incorporate Safety Activities in PMP (Project Manager)

4. Produce the first SC draft (now) (Preparer)

5. Carry out identified activities (Project Manager)

6. Update SC in line with completed activities (Preparer) and conduct document reviews (Project manager-Contributors-Support Safety Department)

EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR THE SAFETY OF
AIR NAVIGATION



Safety Case for SASI CBA

	Editen	:	0.3
	Editen Date	:	10 NOV 2008
	Status	:	General Public
	Class	:	Draft

EUROPEAN AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME



Did you have a question?