



THE ETTO PRINCIPLE:

EFFICIENCY-THOROUGHNESS TRADE-OFF
OR

WHY THINGS THAT GO RIGHT SOMETIMES GO WRONG

ERIK HOLLNAGEL
PROFESSOR, PH.D.

E-MAIL: HOLLNAGEL.ERIK@GMAIL.COM

Single European Sky (SES)

The objective of the Single European Sky (SES) is “to enhance current air traffic safety standards, to contribute to the sustainable development of the air transport system and to improve the overall performance of air traffic management (ATM) and air navigation services (ANS) for general air traffic in Europe, with a view to meeting the requirements of all airspace users.”



Specific objectives for RP2



Safety	Effectiveness of safety management Application of severity application scheme based on the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) methodology.
Environment	Horizontal flight efficiency <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Using last filed flight plan- Using radar data for the actual trajectory
Capacity	En route ATFM delay per flight
Cost-efficiency	Determined unit cost for en route air navigation services Determined unit cost for terminal air navigation services


SESAR specific targets



Safety	<p>Effectiveness of safety management Application of severity application scheme based on the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) methodology.</p> <p>SESAR: Improve safety by a factor of 10</p>
Environment	<p>Horizontal flight efficiency</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">- Using last filed flight plan- Using radar data for the actual trajectory <p>SESAR: Reduce environmental impact by 10%</p>
Capacity	<p>En route ATFM delay per flight</p> <p>SESAR: Enable threefold increase in capacity</p>
Cost-efficiency	<p>Determined unit cost for en route air navigation services Determined unit cost for terminal air navigation services</p> <p>SESAR: Cut ATM costs by half</p>

The meaning of safety

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
Safety through occurrence reporting



Each organisation established in a Member State shall develop a process to analyse the details on occurrences collected in accordance with Articles 4 and 5 in order to identify the safety hazards associated with identified occurrences. Based on this analysis it shall determine any appropriate corrective or preventive action required for the enhancement of safety.

National SSPs should include safety performance indicators that measure identified safety risks and set corresponding risk mitigation measures and targets.

A common and harmonised European methodology for development of safety performance indicators and corresponding targets on state level.



Safety-I – when nothing goes wrong




Safety-I: Safety is defined as a condition where the number of adverse outcomes (accidents / incidents / near misses) is as low as possible.



Safety has traditionally been defined by its opposite – the lack of safety.



The lack of safety means that something goes wrong or can go wrong.



Safety-I requires the ability to prevent that something goes wrong. This is achieved by:

1. Find the causes of what goes wrong (RCA).
2. Eliminate causes, disable possible cause-effect links.
3. Measure results by how many fewer things go wrong.

Different process => different outcome



Function (work
as imagined) → Success
(no adverse
events)

Acceptable
outcomes



**“Actions that succeed are
different from actions that fail”**

Malfunction,
non-compliance, → Failure
error (accidents,
incidents)

Unacceptable
outcomes



Increasing safety by reducing failures



Function (work as imagined) → Success (no adverse events) Acceptable outcomes



“Identification and measurement of adverse events is central to safety.”

~~Malfunction, non-compliance, error~~



Failure (accidents, incidents)

Unacceptable outcomes



Why only look at what goes wrong?




Safety-I = Reduced number of adverse events.

Focus is on what goes wrong. Look for failures and malfunctions. Try to eliminate causes and improve barriers.

Safety and core business compete for resources. Learning only uses a fraction of the data available

$10^{-4} := 1$ failure in 10.000 events



Safety-II = Ability to succeed under varying conditions.


Focus is on what goes right. Use that to understand everyday performance, to do better and to be safer.

Safety and core business help each other. Learning uses most of the data available

Various risks in practice




Likelihood of being in a fatal accident on a commercial flight.




1 : 7,000,000
 1.4×10^{-7}

Core Damage Frequency for a nuclear reactor (per reactor year).



1 : 20,000
 5.0×10^{-5}

Likelihood of iatrogenic harm when admitted to a hospital.



1 : 10
 1.0×10^{-1}

ESARR 4: 1.55×10^{-8} / flight hour

Failures or successes?



When something goes wrong,
e.g., 1 event out of 10.000
($10E-4$), humans are assumed
to be responsible in 80-90% of
the cases.




When something goes right,
e.g., 9.999 events out of
10.000, are humans also
responsible in 80-90% of
the cases?



Who or what are responsible
for the remaining 10-20%?

Investigation of failures is
accepted as important.



Who or what are
responsible for the
remaining 10-20%?

Investigation of successes
is rarely undertaken.

Safety II – when everything goes right

Safety is the ability to succeed under varying conditions.


(Risk is the likelihood that this does not happen, that people do not succeed.)

The emphasis is on how things go right, how they work in the first place.


Different outcomes (“normal” results vs. failures) are not distinct binary categories, but rather judgements of value.

Unexpected outcomes are not necessarily a consequence of unexpected processes.

Individuals and organisations must *adjust everything* they do to match the current conditions. Everyday performance must be variable in order for things to work.




Same process => different outcomes



Increase safety by facilitating work



Understanding the variability of everyday performance is the basis for safety.



Constraining performance variability to remove failures will also remove successful everyday work.

The ETTO principle

The ETTO principle describes the fact that people (and organisations) as part of their activities practically always make a trade-off between the resources (time and effort) they spend on preparing an activity and the resources (time, effort and materials) they spend on doing it.

When throughput and output are the prioritised, *efficiency* is more important than *thoroughness*.
When safety and quality are prioritised, *thoroughness* is more important than *efficiency*.

It follows from the ETTO principle that it is impossible to maximise efficiency and thoroughness at the same time. Nor can an activity expect to succeed, if there is not a minimum of either.



Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off

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Thoroughness: Time to think

Recognising situation.
Choosing and planning.

If thoroughness dominates,
there may be too little time
to carry out the actions.

Neglect pending actions
Miss new events




Efficiency: Time to do

Implementing plans.
Executing actions.

If efficiency dominates,
actions may be badly
prepared or wrong

Miss pre-conditions
Look for expected results



Some ETTO heuristics

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Cognitive (individual)

Judgement under
uncertainty

Cognitive primitives
(SM – FG)

Reactions to
information input
overload and
underload

Cognitive style

Confirmation bias



Idiosyncratic (work related)

Looks fine

Not really important

Normally OK, no need to check

I've done it millions of time before

Will be checked by someone else

Has been checked by someone else

This way is much quicker

No time (or resources) to do it now

Can't remember how to do it

We always do it this way

It looks like X (so it probably is X)

We must get this done

Must be ready in time

Must not use too much of X

Collective (organisation)

Negative reporting

Reduce
redundancy


Meet "production"
targets

Reduce
unnecessary cost


Double-bind

Reject conflicting
information

Thoroughness takes time



“In splitting a board, a circular-saw operator suffered the loss of his thumb when, **in violation of instructions**, he pushed the board past the saw with his fingers, instead of using the push stick that had been provided for the purpose.”




“He stated that he had always done such work in this manner and had never before been hurt. He had performed similar operations on an average of twenty times a day for three months and had therefore exposed his hand in this way over one thousand five hundred times.”
(Heinrich, 1931 “Industrial accident prevention”)



Work as imagined – follow the rules!

Box 1: Professional bodies and national agencies who publish guidelines for anaesthetists

Association of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland
Academy of Medical Royal Colleges
Association of Cardiac Anaesthetists
Association of Paediatric Anaesthetists
British Association of Day Surgery
British National Formulary
British Pain Society
Department of Health
Difficult Airway Society
European Society of Anaesthesiology
Faculty of Pain Medicine
General Medical Council
Health and Safety Executive
Intensive Care Society
Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulation Authority
National Patient Safety Agency
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
Obstetric Anaesthetists Association
Resuscitation Council (UK)
Royal College of Anaesthetists
Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines Network



Emergency surgery on a fractured neck of femur involves app. 75 clinical guidelines and policies.

UK Government guideline on “Working Together to Safeguard Children” is 390 pages long!

Carthey et al (2011). Breaking the rules: understanding non-compliance with policies and guidelines. BMJ

Why do people adjust their work?



AVOID

anything that may have negative consequences for yourself, your group, or organisation

COMPENSATE FOR

unacceptable conditions so that it becomes possible to do your work.

MAINTAIN / CREATE

conditions that may be of use in case of future problems.

Pushback going wrong



The crew had not realized that the ground crew was about to commence the pushback. They were waiting for, the ground crew to command them to release the parking brakes, where after the pushback would begin.

The driver received the “thumbs up” signal, and applied power to begin the pushback. Noticing resistance, he applied more power. Then suddenly, without any signs, the nose landing gear collapsed rearwards, without braking the shear pin.

Thoroughness

Every airline has its own handling procedures. Aircraft of one airline will often be handled by another airline. The airline has to provide the handling company with a copy of the procedures to be used, the handling company then has to train its personnel in the use of the procedures to be used.

Efficiency

Ground crew handle many airlines, with different procedures. It is therefore not uncommon that they use some form of “general” procedure, which can differ from the official one.



FRA Approach Phraseology



Standard phraseology

“DLH123, Langen Radar identified,
cleared OSMAX 25 Transition,
high speed approved”

Non-standard phraseology

“Gude, DLH123, OSMAX 25 Transition,
high speed”

Duration:
About 4.7 seconds



Duration:
about 3.0 seconds

Time saved: about 1.7 seconds

How much is 1.7 seconds worth?



Number of movements during peak days


> 1.500 movements/day

Number of arrivals during peak times

> 50 arrivals/hour



There are about 14 transmissions per arrival – not including the time for readbacks.



With 50 arrivals/hour this means more than 700 transmissions/hour on frequency.

Saving just 1 second per transmission corresponds to 11 minutes saved per hour.

Where can we find ETTOing?

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Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Offs are made by all professions and can be found on all levels of an organisation – from top management to daily operations.



The impact of ETTO on safety



The EoSM indicator is measured by computing scores based on the verified responses to questionnaires completed by the State/competent authorities (normally the NSA) and ANSPs respectively.

Effectiveness of safety management (EoSM)

Safety
(SPIs)

Application of severity application scheme based on the Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) methodology.

All ANSPs should report ATM Ground using the RAT severity classification for all investigations.
In addition, all Regulators should report ATM Overall using the RAT severity classifications for almost all investigations.


The impact of ETTO on safety



Investigations that search for causes (risk elements), and recommendations that focus on such elements represent a Safety-I rather than Safety-II perspective, hence chooses efficiency over thoroughness.

The Risk Analysis Tool (RAT) provides a method for consistent and coherent identification of risk elements. It also allows users to effectively prioritise actions designed to reduce the effect of those elements.

Efficiency (safety) in the present requires thoroughness in the past.



ETTO – successes and failures



Trade-offs between efficiency and thoroughness (ETTO) are both normal and necessary.

In the vast majority of cases, the outcome is a success (outcome is as expected). Since this is taken for granted, it is rarely analysed or investigated.

In very few cases, the outcome is a failure (outcome is **not** as expected). If the consequences are serious (loss of time, material, money or life), the event is investigated to find the cause.

An ETTO is always approximate – because of the very reasons that make it necessary! Making an efficiency-thoroughness trade-off is never wrong in itself!

People are expected to be both efficient and thorough at the same time – or rather to be thorough, when with hindsight it was wrong to be efficient.

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


Thank you for your attention

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