

EUROCONTROL ES2 – WS3

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Direction générale de l'Aviation civile
Direction des services de la Navigation aérienne

PARIS – CDG

Non compliant approaches

vs

Loss of separation on interception

An example of trade off in a complex system

Loïc DE RANCOURT

DSNA – SNA-RP CDG – Operations Department

Resources, territoires, habitats et logement
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Présent pour l'avenir



PARIS – CDG

- **Non compliant approaches vs Loss of separation on interception**

An example of trade off in a complex system

- Complex simultaneous approaches'rules
- CDG's Safety action plan
- An illustrated example
- A comprehensive approach
- Conclusion / Way forward



Charles De Gaulle APP : Complex simultaneous approaches' rules

To understand CDG specificities regarding simultaneous independent double (triple) approaches we have first to go through interception rules (we will take as an example an easterly configuration with ILS RWY 08R and 09L approaches in use) :


- Aircraft vectored on the finals have to be separated from each other. Only once aircraft on approach are established on the various LLZ courses they are considered as separated and independent
- For this reason specific interception marks, in case of simultaneous approaches, have been defined to ensure either 3Nm or 1000ft between aircraft intercepting final ILS approaches
- Since the distance between the LLZ courses is very close (2 Nm), any overshoot of the localizer course could potentially lead to a serious loss of separation




RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE



FACING EAST





CDG's Safety Action Plan

- A number of actions have been undertaken with some success by CDG's Operations Department in the last two years to decrease significantly the number of loss of separation on interception (LOS)
- Reflexion as been initiated to ensure that decrease in LOS does not generate precursors to other potential safety events (especially non compliant approaches that could lead to potential unstabilised approaches)


Illustration about the difficulties to fight against NCAs without consequences on LOS on interception




A comprehensive approach :

*Understand more efficiently the issues
to increase the global level of safety*

- Due to the complexity of CDG's ATC system, the need to have a thorough and comprehensive view on the various safety issues at stake was felt
- First step on NCAs issue was to analyse whether defined rules of interception where complied with
- For that only an automatic detection could fulfill the requirements and thus creation of a specific analysis tool




- Beginning of study and first results




CONCLUSION / WAY FORWARD

- Validation of assumptions
- Levers of action
- Reflexions :
 - Thorough study of relations between NCA ↔ NSA ↔ Safety event (CFIT or RWY excursion)
 - Analysis of Regulatory environment







NCA MAY 2012

On 21481 approaches performed:

2940 too high (14%)

1417 lateral (7%)


Too low and oscillating are very few

Hence 21% of it all performed "significative" NCAs (lateral+too high)

Focus on highest interception altitudes:

27R: 30% performed significative NCAs

08R: 32% performed significative NCAs



DSNA

Thank You



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