

CEO Safety Seminar


Limassol, Cyprus

Nicolas DUBOIS on behalf of Maurice GEORGES




Safety Performance - tons of indicators...


Evolutions du Nb de pertes de séparation en CRNA




Evolutions des pertes de séparation en CRNA vs trafic



Evolutions du NB d'incursions sur piste



Evolutions gravité des pertes de séparation en CRNA vs trafic



19 octobre 2010

Mission de la Sécurité de la Qualité et de la


Direction générale de l'Aviation civile
Direction des services de la Navigation aérienne



Loss of separation - significant ones

1° - Implementation of the Risk Analysis Tool


2° - New definition of significant occurrence



Significatifs =>12/10		Gravité Globale				
		A	B	C	E	D
Dysfonc. NA	a					
	b					
	c					
	e					
	d					


Significatifs 01/11 =>		Gravité Globale				
		A	B	C	E	D
Gravité ATS	a					
	b					
	c					
	e					
	d					

Need to go deeper and look wider - Risk Management and Detection of Weak Signals



Link with State Safety Plan

Management board decision on prioritisation



+Local application

Measurement (performance, efficiency)

Updates (changes,...)

Evolutions (new risks)

Evolutions (barriers, risk mitigation measures)


« What we know from our history »



Our trees of causes

Safety Barriers and associated strategies

« How do we know what's happening »




Scenarios

Indicators

Potential consequences

Example of Thunderstorm situations



How to go wider ? Building a Fabec safety culture

You can't decree a Fab Safety Culture

A Common Safety Culture develops through common projects and concrete cooperation

A common safety culture requires an open and transparent climate among ANSPs

NSAs can help... but there's also a risk that an action from NSAs be an obstacle to ANSP cooperation

Building a common safety culture

Exchange of safety data :

Safety events

Lessons learnt ?



Recommandations ?

Safety performance measurement and improvement

Automatic reporting

Robust indicators

Needs to be based on a mature just culture at ANSP level and at NSA level



Issues at stake with safety exchange

- We have at least 17000 safety events in our safety database. If an accident happens tomorrow, it will probably bear some similarity with at least a few of these safety events => who will support the blame ?
- We, as ANSPs, have developped mechanisms to extract, as far as possible, significant information from these database and set priorities to make an optimal use of our resources :
 - In terms of safety analysis
 - To drive our actions
- The NSA can help or hinder this prioritization effort


How can it go right or wrong (1/2)

- In-depth analysis required by NSA : acceptable in principle (it can't be otherwise) but good practices are necessary lest all safety analysis resources are dedicated to NSA requests
- Action plans required by NSAs : acceptable in principle (it can't...) but shouldn't lead to « DO EVERYTHING AND NOW » lest ANSPs stop taking action and wait for the NSA to make decisions
- It means the NSA should have an in-deph knowledge of the ANSP's SMS


How can it go right or wrong 2/2

- Safety targets setting : acceptable in principle (it...) : but needs to be realistic enough
- Temptation of benchmarking leads to hiding the copy
- Safety seminar, february, 8th and 9th, with participation from Fab partner and major airline : acknowledge cultural differences but don't encourage them !


Safety performance - indicators with target defined by the NSA/regulator




Loss of separation for 100 000 mvts




Significant runway incursion with
ATM contribution



Airspace Infringement VFR in class A, C et D



Loss of separation with positive rate of
closure - Paris CDG



END