

EUROCONTROL



**EUROCONTROL Guidance
Material for Area Proximity
Warning
Appendix B-3 Outline Safety Case
for APW System**

Edition Number	:	1.0
Edition Date	:	19 May 2008
Status	:	Released Issue
Intended for	:	CND Stakeholders



DOCUMENT CHARACTERISTICS

TITLE			
EUROCONTROL Guidance Material for Area Proximity Warning			
Appendix B-3 Outline Safety Case for APW System			
Document Identifier	Edition Number:		
EUROCONTROL-GUID-125	1.02		
	Edition Date:		
	19 May 2008		
Abstract			
<p>This document is part of a set of three documents the purpose of which is to provide guidance material for ANSPs to assure their own implementations of APW in accordance with the EUROCONTROL Specification for Area Proximity Warning (APW). This document outlines a possible Safety Case.</p>			
Keywords			
Safety Nets	Safety Case		
APW			
Safety Argument			
Safety Plan			
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STATUS, AUDIENCE AND ACCESSIBILITY			
Status	Intended for	Accessible via	
Working Draft	<input type="checkbox"/> General Public	<input type="checkbox"/> Intranet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Draft	<input type="checkbox"/> CND Stakeholders	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Extranet	<input type="checkbox"/>
Proposed Issue	<input type="checkbox"/> Restricted Audience	<input type="checkbox"/> Internet (www.eurocontrol.int)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Released Issue	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Printed & electronic copies of the document can be obtained from the ALDA Infocentre (see page iii)		


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DOCUMENT APPROVAL

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DOCUMENT CHANGE RECORD

The following table records the complete history of the successive editions of the present document.

EDITION NUMBER	EDITION DATE	REASON FOR CHANGE	PAGES AFFECTED
1.0	19-5-2009	First released issue	All

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is Safety Management best practice and an ESARR 4 requirement to ensure that all new safety related ATM systems or changes to the existing system will meet their safety objectives and safety requirements. ANSPs and National Supervisory Authorities (NSA) will need documented assurance that this is the case before deploying the new or changed system in operation. Typically, the assurance is presented as a safety case.

This document is one of a set of three documents the purpose of which is to provide guidance material for ANSPs to assure their own implementations of APW in accordance with the EUROCONTROL Specification. Each document represents a snapshot of the safety assurance work already undertaken at different stages of a project. The document set includes:

1. **Initial Safety Argument for Area Proximity Warning:** - Ideally, produced during the definition phase of a project to introduce a change to the ATM system e.g. to introduce APW. The process of developing and acquiring the necessary assurance is considerably enhanced if the safety arguments are set out clearly from the outset.
2. **Generic Safety Plan for the implementation of APW:** - Initially produced at the outset of a project as part of the project plan, but focused only on those activities necessary to provide assurance information for inclusion in a safety case. The safety plan will be subject to development and change as the project unfolds and more detail becomes available.
3. **Outline Safety Case for APW** [This document]:- Commenced at the start of a project, structured in line with the safety argument, and documented as the results of the planned safety assurance activates become available.

The necessary safety assurance is obtained by following a planned safety assessment process appropriate to each stage of the system development lifecycle. This document follows the process as described in EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM). It addresses in detail the assurance and evidence from the System Definition stage within the SAM lifecycle. This corresponds to the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) and the Preliminary Safety Assessment Process (PSSA) in SAM. It outlines the likely assurance and evidence for the later stages.

Individual ANSPs implementing APW might be starting from different points, and their concept of operations, requirements and designs may differ. Guidance is provided throughout this document where individual ANSPs may need to deviate from, the arguments and evidence in this outline safety case.

If ANSPs adopt a lifecycle different to one in SAM, they will need to revise this outline safety case.

Note: This is guidance material only – It is not intended to demonstrate that APW is safe. It requires effort from the ANSP to transfer this outline case into a complete safety case.

1. INTRODUCTION

APW is a ground-based safety net intended to warn the controller of unauthorised penetration into an airspace volume by generating, in a timely manner, an alert of a potential or actual infringement of the required spacing to that airspace volume.

The European Convergence and Implementation Plan (ECIP) contains an Objective (ATC02.5) for ECAC-wide standardisation of APW in accordance with the EUROCONTROL Specification for Area Proximity Warning [Ref 1]. The EUROCONTROL Specification for APW specifies, in qualitative terms, the common performance characteristics of APW as well as the prerequisites for achieving these performance characteristics.

The detailed safety work must be undertaken in accordance with European and National regulations and directives, which may refer to the EUROCONTROL recommended methodologies and practices. The current document is part of a set of documents that have been produced under contract by NATS, to serve as guidance material for carrying out the detailed safety work using the EUROCONTROL recommended methodologies and practices.

A Safety Case is the documented assurance of the achievement and maintenance of safety. It is primarily the means by which those who are accountable for service provision or projects assure **themselves**, and the Regulator, that those services or projects are delivering (or will deliver), and will continue to deliver, an acceptable level of safety.

2. PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

The purpose of this document is to illustrate through examples an outline structure for a safety case that can be used by ANSPs in documenting safety assurance for APW applications. The necessary safety assurance is obtained by following a planned safety assessment process appropriate to each stage of the system development lifecycle. This document follows the process described in EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) and complies with the **essential** requirements of the EUROCONTROL Safety Case Development Manual (SCDM) [Ref 7].

The overall approach for developing the safety case is shown in Figure 2-1¹ below. The safety assurance objectives (what has to be done) and activities (how the objectives are achieved) to be accomplished in the subsequent phases of the lifecycle are determined from the safety argument and the safety plan. The evidence that the assurance objectives have been achieved is obtained from the SAM Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary Safety Assessment (PSSA), and the System Safety Assessment (SSA) and presented in the Safety Case.

¹ Figure 2-1 and associated text adapted from Safety Assessment Made Easy [Ref 4]




Figure 2-1: Overall Approach

GUIDANCE: This document is the Outline Safety Case for APW. Its purpose is to provide guidance material for ANSPs to assure their own implementations of APW in accordance with the EUROCONTROL Specification. It addresses in detail the assurance and evidence from the System Definition stage within the SAM lifecycle. It outlines the likely assurance and evidence for the later stages.

Individual ANSPs implementing APW might be starting from different points, and their concept of operations, requirements and designs may differ. Guidance is provided throughout this document where individual ANSPs may need to deviate from, or augment the arguments and evidence in this Outline Safety Case.

If ANSPs adopt a lifecycle different to one in SAM, they will need to revise this Outline Safety Case.

3. SCOPE

This Outline Safety Case contains details of the safety assurance necessary to show that APW will be acceptably safe in ATM operations. The arguments and the evidence to give this assurance are presented in document.

Only the assurance derived during system definition phase of the APW lifecycle is covered in any detail. An outline is given of the safety assurance required from the other lifecycle phases. The assurance was derived in accordance with the Generic Safety Plan for APW Implementation and each assurance item is linked by reference to the activities listed in the Safety Plan.

The Safety Case is derived from the overall argument structure described in the document, "Initial Safety Argument for Area Proximity Warning", through

activities described in the Generic Safety Plan for APW Implementation. Whereas that document outlines the safety argument, this safety case implements that argument and provides the evidence to support it.

GUIDANCE: APW is a function provided within the surveillance system and is dependent on it. As such, ANSPs may legitimately decide not to have a stand-alone safety case for APW, but to include the assurance in the safety case for the surveillance system.

4. OVERALL SAFETY ARGUMENT

4.1 Introduction

The overall argument is structured as shown in Diagram A below. The sub arguments are mapped onto the APW development phases from system definition through to operation and maintenance. This is to enable the planned safety assurance activities to be linked closely to APW development and the safety case development. Each of the arguments has to be satisfied in order to make the safety case.

4.2 Safety Argument and Evidence Sections

The following sections present each of the strands of the safety arguments in turn, together with the evidence to show that each of the arguments is met. The assurance objectives (as determined from the Initial Safety Argument and the Safety Plan) are given in a table following each argument, together with a summary of the evidence to be found in the safety case.




Diagram A: Overall Argument Structure

Note: Where Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) is used in the document the argument symbols have different colours to reflect the degree to which the particular argument has been addressed in this Outline Safety Case. “Green” indicates that the argument and evidence is reasonably well developed. “Green/Pink” indicates that the argument is only partly addressed, or not at all.

4.3

Top Level Argument [Arg. 0]

The top-level argument for which assurance is required is that “APW will be acceptably safe in ATM operations”.

4.4

Criteria

GUIDANCE: The criteria for deciding what will constitute “acceptably safe” have to be established at the outset.

Criteria for judging if APW is acceptably safe are:

- **CRITERION 01**, current levels of safety are not reduced by the inclusion of APW *i.e. there is no net increase in the number of incidents above current levels as result of installing and operating APW.*

Note: Criterion 01 cannot be shown to be met until APW has been implemented.

- **CRITERION 02**, any negative effects on safety are small compared with the safety benefit *i.e. that the number of incidents contributed to by APW is small compared to the number resolved by ATC as a result of an APW Alert.*
- **CRITERION 03**, any negative effects on safety are reduced as far as reasonably practicable *i.e. this criterion points to the need to include mitigation means to ensure that the number of incidents contributed to by APW is small, and consistent with the requirements of criterion 02.*

GUIDANCE: Depending on ANSPs safety management arrangements and regulatory arrangement, it is possible that some ANSPs will wish to provide quantifications of these criteria 01, 02 and 03. The actual quantification is a matter of National choice.

ANSPs who have already implemented APW may be able to quantify the safety benefit based on historical performance data.

For some ANSPs, it is likely that a qualitative argument about the benefits will have to be made initially.

Illustrative Examples:

Example of a quantified system requirement derived from Criterion 2:

-- 80% of eligible conflicts are to be alerted, of which 80% have a warning time of 30 seconds or more.

-- The number of nuisance alerts shall comprise less than 1% of all alerts displayed to the controller.

4.5 Context

In addition to meeting the above criteria, APW will also need to be deemed acceptably safe in relation to the SRC Policy [Ref 5] for Safety Nets (See Safety Plan 7.1.2).

4.5.1 Context 01 Safety Policy for APW

The EUROCONTROL Safety Regulation Commission (SRC) acknowledges that ground based safety nets are part of the ATM system and contribute positively to its safety. As APW is classed as a ground based safety net, this policy is relevant to this safety case.

The EUROCONTROL Specification for APW has provided generic policy statements to which are consistent with the SRC Policy, and these are adopted as the starting point for this safety case:

“APW is a safety net; its sole purpose is to enhance safety and its presence is ignored when calculating sector capacity”.

"APW is designed, configured and used to make a significant positive contribution to prevention of accidents arising from unauthorised penetration into an airspace volume.

GUIDANCE: This Outline Safety Case is based on the EUROCONTROL Specification for APW, and hence the policy it describes.

4.5.2 Context 02 Concept of Operation for APW

The Concept of Operations (Conops) upon which this Outline Safety Case is based was developed by the SPIN Task Force / Sub Group. The Conops is included in the EUROCONTROL Specification for Area Proximity Warning. For APW to be acceptably safe, the Conops itself needs to be safe. An argument to that effect is included in this document.

4.6 Assumptions

GUIDANCE: ANSPS should include here any assumptions on which the top level argument is dependent e.g. the host surveillance system is acceptably safe (See Safety Plan 7.1.3).

4.7 Strategy A1

The main strategy adopted to meet Arg 0 is to show that if a correct APW specification exists and is complied with both technically and operationally, the resulting system can be expected to meet Criteria 01, 02 and 03. This is dependent on satisfying four Arguments (Arg 1 to Arg 4) as represented in Goal-structuring Notation (GSN)² in Figures B1 to B4.

4.8 Justification 01

Compliance with EUROCONTROL Safety Policy as expressed in the EUROCONTROL Specification for APW is necessary to justify the argument that APW will be acceptably safe. This policy is reflected in the Criteria 01, 02 and 03.

5. APW SPECIFICATION AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

5.1 Assurance Evidence

Evidence is required from the System Definition and Design phase to demonstrate that **Arg 1** can be considered to be true i.e. that APW has been specified to be acceptably safe. The strategy followed to show that **Arg 1** can be considered to be true is shown in Diagram B1, together with sub-arguments (Arg 1.1 to Arg 1.7) and pointers to the Tables listing the safety assurance objectives to be addressed.


² This is the adapted form recommended by the EUROCONTROL SCDM [Ref 7].

The safety assurance objectives to be addressed, and for which evidence is required, are shown in a Table under each argument heading, together with summary of the evidence offered in this safety case.

The safety assurance objectives are based on EUROCONTROL paper entitled "Safety Assessment Made Easier" [Ref 4].

GUIDANCE: Arguments 1.1 to 1.4 are concerned with the success of APW in contributing to ATM safety i.e. in reducing the risks of unauthorised penetration by aircraft into an airspace volume. The specified functional and non-functional requirements for APW determine how safe it needs to be in the absence of failure and are therefore regarded as APW safety requirements. Note: As stated previously, these safety requirements are distinct from, and in addition to, those derived under argument 1.5 below.

Argument 1.5 is concerned only with the consequences of failure of APW (i.e. new hazards) and leads mainly to a specification of Safety Objectives³ and Safety Requirements⁴ for the integrity of the system.



5.2

The Conops is safe in itself [Arg 1.1].

The Concept of Operation (Conops) describes what APW is intended to achieve operationally, and defines the key functionality and performance

³ Safety Objectives is a term used in ESARR 4 [Ref 8] and in EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology to describe the maximum tolerable occurrence rate of hazards.

⁴ Safety Requirements refer to the mitigation means for hazards

parameters and how it is to be used. The assurance issue is whether the underlying Concept is capable of satisfying Criteria 01, 02 and 03, assuming that a suitable design could be produced and implemented (See Safety Plan 7.1.4). The assurance objectives to be addressed to satisfy Arg 1.1 are shown in Table B1-1, together with summary of the evidence offered in this safety case.

Arg 1.1 – Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Show that the initial safety issues have been identified and addressed.	The draft Conops has been subject to formal review and modified to mitigate any hazards identified. See next paragraph 5.3.
(2) Show that the minimum functionality has been defined and shown to be compatible with Safety Criterion 02 and 03.	The argument and evidence is described in paragraph 5.3
(3) Show that the differences from existing Conops have been described, in terms of what APW will do when introduced into the ATM system.	The “existing system” referred to here is the non-APW ATM system. The Conops describes what APW will do when introduced into the system.
(4) Show that the impact of the Conops on the operational environment (including interfaces with adjacent systems/airspace) has been assessed and shown to be compatible with safety criteria 02 and 03.	The areas to be considered are identified in the Conops and the EUROCONTROL Specification. However, it is a matter for the ANSP to assess the actual impact on their system.

Table B1-1: Assurance Objectives to satisfy Arg 1.1

5.3

The minimum functionality has been defined and shown to be compatible with Safety Criterion 02 and 03.

APW is not a new concept, and it comes pre-installed on many modern surveillance systems. However, there is evidence that some existing APW implementations, although inherently capable of functioning as efficient safety nets, their capabilities are not always used effectively. Also, accidents occur which it is believed may have been prevented had APW been provided.

Such considerations led to the establishment of the Safety nets: Planning Implementation and eNhancements (SPIN) Task Force in 2005 to develop standards and supporting guidance material for safety nets, including APW. The work involved 11 ATS providers, 5 industrial suppliers and the EUROCONTROL Agency. The Task Force (nowadays the SPIN Sub Group) produced specifications for STCA, APW, APW and APW.

The APW Specification developed includes the Concept of Operation and the key (minimum) functionality and performance parameters for APW. The key factors necessary for safe and effective use of the Concept are addressed and include:

- Safety Net policy
- Human Factors

- Design
- Technical aspects
- Interactions with other Safety Nets
- Provision for future directions

Significant amongst these from a safety point of view are:

- APW policy, as described previously
- The Conops is designed to ensure that, when the geometry of the situation permits, alerts are notified with sufficient warning time for all necessary steps to be taken from the controller recognising the alert to the aircraft successfully executing an appropriate manoeuvre, and that nuisance alerts are kept to an effective minimum.
- The requirements for training and awareness of controllers in the operation of APW
- The importance of monitoring the performance of the system and optimising it to maintain effectiveness.

5.3.1 Conclusions

Based on the documented process followed by SPIN in developing the APW Specification and Conops, and the expert judgement and operational experience of APW of those involved, it is concluded that the Conops and the Specification has the potential to meet the safety criteria

GUIDANCE: If an ANSP is currently using an APW system, it will need to document here the evidence that it is consistent with the EUROCONTROL concept, or otherwise show that the top level argument is met.

If an ANSP is not currently using an APW system and it is able to use the EUROCONTROL concept of operation then it can document that here.

5.4 The corresponding APW design is complete [Arg 1.2]

5.4.1 Assurance Evidence

The assurance issue here is whether everything necessary to achieve a safe implementation of the Concept has been specified in the EUROCONTROL Specification (See Safety Plan 7.1.5).

GUIDANCE: ANSPs will need to have functional and non-functional requirements for APW appropriate to their concept of operation and operational environment. This will inevitably be more detailed than the EUROCONTROL Specification. The Guidance Material for APW – Appendix A: APW Reference System [Ref 3] provides detailed guidance in this regard.

The Assurance objectives to be addressed to satisfy Arg 1.2 are shown in Table B1-2, together with summary of the evidence offered in this safety case.

Arg 1.2 – Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Show that everything necessary to achieve a safe implementation of the Conops – related to human, procedure, equipment and airspace design - has been specified.	The Function and non-functional requirements from the EUROCONTROL Specification are mapped on to the Conops. These are shown to be consistent with the Conops by reference to the Tables B1-2a to B1-2g
(2) Show that all the safety requirements on and assumptions about, external elements of the APW have been captured.	The APW specification has been formally reviewed to ensure that it covers external elements of APW. <i>The ANSP will have to provide this assurance in relation to their APW system.</i>

Table B1-2: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 1.2

5.4.2

Functional and non-functional safety requirements

As the whole objective for APW is to reduce risk in ATM, the functional and non-functional requirements⁵ specified in the EUROCONTROL Specification are, by inference, safety requirements. These relate to the “success case” – i.e. that APW will be acceptably safe in the absence of failure⁶. Note: These safety requirements are distinct from and in addition to those derived under Arg 1.5.

⁵ **Functional requirements** specify what the system should do. **Non-functional requirements** specify how a system must behave; they are a constraint upon the systems behaviour. Typical non-functional requirements are performance, throughput, utilisation etc.

⁶ Refer to EUROCONTROL SAM Part 1

(1) **FUNCTIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:**

Concept of Operation – Functional Safety Requirements:	
Conops 3.1:	
<p>APW adds independent alerting logic to the control loop in order to warn the controller about unauthorised penetration of an airspace volume by generating alerts of existing or pending situations, related to the position and speed of an aircraft relative to that airspace volume, which require attention/action.</p> <p>The following Safety Requirements relate to this aspect of the Conops:</p>	
Req No:	Safety Requirement
APW 07	APW <u>shall</u> detect and alert operationally relevant situations for eligible aircraft.
APW 08	APW <u>shall</u> provide alerts for operationally relevant situations. (Refer to note in Ch. 4.3.1 of APW Specification [Ref 1] for meaning of “relevant”).
APW 09	APW alerts <u>shall</u> attract the controller’s attention and identify the aircraft involved in the situation; APW alerts <u>shall</u> be at least visual.
APW 13	APW <u>shall</u> continue to provide alert(s) as long as the alert conditions exist
APW 14	APW <u>shall</u> provide the possibility to inhibit alerts for predefined volumes of airspace and for individual flights. (Refer to Guidance material for APW, Appendix A [Ref 3] for more details on this function).
APW 15	Alert inhibitions <u>shall</u> be made known to all controllers concerned. (Refer to Guidance material for APW, Appendix A [Ref 3] for guidance on pertinent data)
APW 16	Status information <u>shall</u> be presented to supervisor and controller working positions in case APW is not available.
APW 18	All pertinent APW data <u>shall</u> be made available for off-line analysis. (Refer to Guidance material for APW, Appendix A [Ref 3] for guidance on pertinent data)

Table B1-2a: Mapping functional safety requirements

(2) NON-FUNCTIONAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:

Concept of Operation - Procedures Safety Requirements:	
Req No:	Safety Requirement
APW 04	Local instructions concerning use of APW <u>shall</u> be specified. See APW Specification [Ref 1] Ch 4.2 Requirements on Procedures for details.
APW 05	In the event an alert is generated in respect of a controlled flight, the controller <u>shall</u> without delay assess the situation and if necessary take action to ensure that the required spacing to that airspace volume will not be infringed or will be restored. If that is not possible the controller <u>shall</u> take action to mitigate the consequences of the unauthorised penetration.

Table B1-2b: Mapping safety requirements

Concept of Operation - System Boundaries and Environment Functions:	
Req No:	Safety Requirement
APW A1	<p>APW is relates to civil aircraft about to enter a restricted area, military aerobatic area or danger area, and also to aircraft not under ATC that have entered controlled airspace.</p> <p>APW may need to take into account the type of flight as well as the specific volume of airspace in which the aircraft is flying, in order to apply appropriate parameters or trajectory predictions. Different parameters may be applied in the case of system degradation (e.g. unavailability of one or more radar stations).</p> <p>The rule set and alerting strategy should be determined taking into account the relevant system boundaries and environmental functions.</p> <p>(Refer to Appendix A of the APW guidance material [Ref 3] for detailed information on this requirement)</p>

Table B1-2c: Mapping safety requirements

Concept of Operation - Performance Safety Requirements:

Conops 3.1: APW is intended to function in the short term, if applicable providing warning times of up to 2 minutes.

Conops 3.2: APW is only effective if the number of nuisance alerts remains below an acceptable threshold according to local requirements and if it provides sufficient warning time to resolve hazardous situations, governed by the inherent characteristics of the human centred system.

The following safety requirements are relevant here:

Req No:	Safety Requirement
APW 10	<p>The number of nuisance alerts produced by APW <u>shall</u> be kept to an effective minimum.</p> <p>Note: what constitutes an effect minimum will be decided on factors such as the impact on controller workload, and whether resolution and/or recovery functions are impaired in any way. See also Guidance material for APW, Appendix A [Ref 3] for additional guidance in this regard.</p>
APW 11	<p>The number of false⁷ alerts produced by APW <u>shall</u> be kept to an effective minimum.</p> <p>See Note above.</p>
APW 12	<p>When the geometry of the situation permits, the warning time <u>shall</u> be sufficient for all necessary steps to be taken from the controller recognising the alert to the concerned aircraft successfully executing an appropriate manoeuvre.</p>

Table B1-2d: Mapping performance safety requirements

⁷ A False Alert is defined in the EUROCONTROL Specification as an Alert which does not correspond to a situation requiring particular attention or action (e.g. caused by split tracks and radar reflections).

Concept of Operation – Monitoring Performance Safety Requirements:

Conops 3.3.3: All pertinent APW data should be recorded for offline analysis.

APW Specification 4.2.4: The appropriate ATS authority should retain electronic records of all alerts generated. The data and circumstances pertaining to each alert should be analysed to determine whether an alert was justified or not. Non-justified alerts should be ignored. A statistical analysis should be made of justified alerts in order to identify possible shortcomings in airspace design and ATC procedures as well as to monitor overall safety levels.

The following safety requirement is relevant here:

Req No:	Safety Requirement
APW 06	APW performance <i>shall</i> be analysed regularly to identify possible shortcomings related to APW. (Refer to guidance material for APW Appendix A [Ref 3] for guidance on data to be analysed)

Table B1-2e: Mapping performance safety requirements

Concept of Operation – Policy

Conops 3.2: It is essential that individual ANSPs establish a clear APW policy for their particular operational context to avoid ambiguity about the role and use of APW.

The following non-functional safety requirements should be reflected in the policy [Safety Plan 7.1.2].

Req No:	Safety Requirement
SRC Policy 5.1 (2&3).	APW is a Safety Net, and should not to be designed or relied upon as a sole means of means of potential mitigation for identified hazards.
SRC Policy 5.3 (9)	APW users should be aware that the safety of the service is predicated on their continuing to ensure separation without relying on it.
APW 01	The ANSP <i>shall</i> have a formal policy on the use of APW consistent with the operational concept and safety management system applied to avoid ambiguity about the role and purpose of APW.
APW 02	The ANSP <i>shall</i> assign to one or more staff, as appropriate, the responsibility for overall management of APW.

Table B1-2f: Mapping safety requirements

Concept of Operation – Training and Awareness safety requirements:

SRC policy: In order to ensure correct and effective use of ground based safety nets, users should understand the purpose and functioning of ground based safety nets and ...etc. (SRC Policy [Ref 5] Ch. 5.3).

APW specification: The primary goal of the training is to develop and maintain an appropriate level of trust in APW, i.e. to make controllers aware of the likely situations where APW will be effective and, more importantly, situations in which APW will not be so effective (e.g. sudden, unexpected manoeuvres)(See APW Specification [Ref 1] note in Ch. 4.1.3).

The following safety requirement is relevant here:

Req No:	Safety Requirement
APW-03	The ANSP <i>shall</i> ensure that all controllers concerned are given specific APW training and are assessed as competent for the use of the relevant APW system.

Table B1-2g: mapping training safety requirements

5.4.3 Conclusions

Based on the above mapping it is concluded that all the necessary functional and non-functional safety requirements relating to equipment, people, procedures and airspace design has been specified to meet the basic Conops. The justification for this conclusion is that the specification was developed by the same expert group who developed the Conops, and the functional and non-functional requirements are complete and consistent with respect to the Conops.

GUIDANCE: Note that the EUROCONTROL Specification sets minimum requirements only, and ANSP specifications are likely to be more specific, especially in relation to non-functional requirements. However, comparison of ANSP specifications with EUROCONTROL Specification can help to determine completeness of the former. Guidance on these issues can be obtained from Guidance Material for APW – Appendix A [Ref 3].

5.5 APW has been designed to function correctly under all normal conditions [Arg 1.3]

GUIDANCE: What is required is an outline description of the APW design showing the relationship between the APW functions, its boundaries, and the way it will be integrated into the existing ATM system. The level of detail should be sufficient to support the FHA process. [Ref: Safety Plan 7.1.6]

5.5.1 Assurance Evidence

The assurance issue here is whether the system design can reasonably be expected to achieve the functional and non-functional safety requirements. The Assurance objectives to be addressed to satisfy Arg 1.3 are shown in Table B1-3, together with summary of the evidence offered in this safety case.

Arg 1.3 – Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Show that the APW design has been clearly described, and has the potential to show that APW functions correctly under all normal environmental conditions.	The APW design is described in the following paragraphs, supported by diagrams. <i>ANSPs may need to include a more detailed description for their system.</i>
(2) Show that the level of detail is sufficient to support the FHA process and the derivation of safety objectives for the overall design.	EUROCONTROL SAM provides guidance on what to include.

Table B1-3: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 1.3

5.5.2

Outline System Description

APW relies on being supplied with accurate and reliable surveillance track pressure altitude information to detect conflicts.

Environment Data supplies the APW system with the airspace volumes, parameters for conflict detection and QNH. The QNH is used in the conversion of the mode C height into a true altitude, for the purpose of detecting APW conflicts against volumes that are defined in terms of true altitude (feet rather than flight levels).

Flight data is used to determine the eligibility for alert generation and includes the type/category of flight, the sector(s) of concern for alerts and Cleared Flight levels – to increase the relevance of alert generation.

A Block Diagram of the APW system is shown in Figure 5-1. This was derived by reference to the EUROCONTROL Specification for APW, and in particular to the Conops contained therein. The diagram also illustrates the functions of people, procedures and equipment in the APW system, and the interfaces between the system elements.

The ANSPs should provide block diagrams of their actual APW system configuration here to a level consistent with the guidance given above.




Figure 5-1: APW System block diagram

5.5.3 APW System Description

GUIDANCE: Include a summary of the APW system description and how it will operate. This is to aid understanding of the design, and to determine how best to verify and validate it.

An outline the APW system architecture is shown below in Figure 5-2.

The APW system comprises a typical multi-track radar system in which aircraft transponders upon interrogation by the ground radar transmitter reply with the aircraft identity and position data. The data is transmitted from the remote site to the ATC Centre where it is processed and sent to the ATC workstation for display. The data is also recorded for later replay if necessary.

The APW function is hosted by the radar system in the Alert processor, supported by an information data base containing flight data and environmental data.

Note: for the purpose of this safety case only those parts of the system within the ANSP scope to supply are included i.e. the aircraft systems are not included.

The ANSPs should provide a description of their actual APW system configuration here to a level consistent with the guidance given above.

The APW function monitors the radar tracks in the area of interest and checks them for penetrations into restricted or controlled airspace as appropriate. The Alert Processors process the radar data to generate APW Alerts. The Alert Processing computers only host the APW function.




Figure 5-2: APW System Architecture

5.5.4 APW design and process model

GUIDANCE: APW systems can be of different types and complexity and a specific system is not described here or included in this guidance material. Instead, readers are referred to Appendix A: Reference System for practical technical guidance material on APW for consideration in completing this part of the safety case.

ANSPs should include here a description of the main features of their APW design and process model to a level consistent with understanding the rest of the safety case. Include block diagrams of APW elements, details of (or document reference) to processing methods, parameter settings, display presentations and interfaces with other parts of the system.

5.6 The system design is robust against external abnormalities [Arg 1.4]

The assurance issue here whether APW can continue to operate effectively under abnormal conditions in the operational environment or can such conditions cause APW to behave in a way that could actually induce a risk that would otherwise not have arisen (See Safety Plan 7.1.7). The assurance objectives to satisfy Arg 1.4 are shown in Table B1-4, together with summary of the evidence offered in this safety case.

Arg 1.4- Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
<p>(1) Show that the APW design can react safely to all reasonably foreseeable external failures – i.e. any failures in its environment/adjacent systems that are not covered under Arg1.5.</p>	<p>This is under the scope of the FHA activities carried out under Arg 1.5 and may extend to the ATM boundary.</p> <p>This is for the ANSP to address.</p> <p><i>For example, how will APW react to failure of the associated ILS?</i></p>
<p>(2) Show that the design can react safely to all other reasonably foreseeable abnormal conditions in its environment/adjacent systems that are not covered under Arg1.3.</p>	<p>This is for the ANSP to address.</p> <p><i>For example, how will APW react to reduced radar cover adjacent to the defined airspace volume?</i></p>

Table B1-4: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 1.4

5.7

All risks from internal APW failures have been mitigated sufficiently [Arg 1.5]

This argument deals with the APW “failure case” i.e. how failures of APW might have a negative safety impact on the rest of the ATM system.

The Strategy is to apply the FHA/PSSA processes in which the consequences for the safety of ATM are explored by considering the effects on ATM operations resulting from loss, partial loss or corruption of the APW functions (See Safety Plan 7.1.8).

This process leads to the specification of Safety Objectives and Safety Requirements for the integrity of the system that can be expected to satisfy criterion 02.

5.7.1

Assurance Evidence

In compliance with ESARR 4 it is necessary to ensure that the risks associated with hazards stemming from implementing APW are systematically and formally identified, assessed and managed, within acceptable levels, prior to its introduction into operational service (See SRC Policy [Ref 5]).

The concern here is with the **internal** behaviour of APW, from two perspectives: how loss of functionality could reduce the effectiveness of APW as a safety net; and how anomalous behaviour of APW could induce a risk that might otherwise not have occurred pre APW.

The Assurance Objectives to satisfy Arg 1.5 are shown in Table B1-5, together with summary of the evidence offered in this safety case.

Arg 1.5- Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Show that the all reasonably foreseeable hazards, at the boundary of the system, have been identified	Addressed in paragraphs: 5.7.2 (hazard identification); 5.7.3 (scope of FHA); 5.7.4 (process), FHA Results (Table B1-5a).
(2) Show that the severity of the effects from each hazard has been correctly assessed, taking account of any mitigations that may be available/could be provided external to the system	Addressed in FHA Results (Table B1-5a)
(3) Show that the Safety Objectives have been set for each hazard such that the corresponding aggregate risk is within the specified Safety Criteria	Paragraph 5.7.6 and FHA Results (Table B1-5b) <i>ANSP to assign probabilities</i>
(4) Show that the all reasonably foreseeable causes of each hazard have been identified	See paragraph 5.7.7 (hazard causes) and the Fault Tree (Figure 5-6)
(5) Show that the Safety Requirements have been specified (or Assumptions stated) for the causes of each hazard, taking account of any mitigations that are/could be available internal to the system, such that the Safety Objectives (and/or Safety Criteria) are satisfied	See paragraph 5.7.9 and Tables B1-5c, B1-5d and B1-5e. <i>ANSP to assign probabilities</i>
(6) Show that the Safety Requirements have been verified and validated.	See assurance evidence in Table B1-6
(7) Show that the all external and internal mitigations have been captured as either Safety Requirements or Assumptions as appropriate	See for example Safety Objective 08 relating to loss of APW
(8) Show that the APW can actually operate safely under all degraded modes of operation identified under this Argument	Not fully addressed in the PSSA but would include issues such as e.g. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • degraded algorithms and system parameters, • Loss of a radar resulting in loss of multi-track capability

Table B1-5: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 1.5

5.7.2 Hazard Identification

GUIDANCE: To assess the risk arising from internal failures of the system it is necessary to identify the hazards, if any, which can result from functional failures of APW. The process involves taking each of the specified functional requirements and subjecting them to a Functional Hazard Assessment and Preliminary System Safety Assessment. The FHA and PSSA processes followed were those defined in the EUROCONTROL SAM.

It is essential that those involved in the hazard identification process are properly qualified for the purpose. Guidance in this regard is given in SAM FHA Guidance Material B1 and B2.

If ANSPs do not use the EUROCONTROL SAM process, they will need to document and justify the approach they do use.

The functions specified in the EUROCONTROL Specification for APW were subjected to Functional Hazard Assessment to determine how/when ATM conflict detection might not be enhanced by APW and also to determine what negative effects (if any) APW might have on separation provision and/or collision avoidance.

The assessment was conducted as a desktop exercise by suitably qualified safety staff. The EUROCONTROL Conops and Specification and the outline system description derived from it were the basis for the analysis. The analysis is not claimed to be complete, but all the main hazards at ATM system level and APW component level are addressed.

5.7.3 Scope of System Considered for FHA

For the purpose of this FHA, APW is regarded as a safety net component of ATM and the assessment is scoped at this level (See EUROCONTROL SAM FHA Guidance Material).

GUIDANCE: When identifying hazards, different levels of hazards can be considered. A hazard is identified at the boundary of the scope of the system under assessment. The situation is illustrated in Figure 5.3 below. Three boundary levels were considered:

1. ATM level, where the effects of hazards will manifest themselves.
2. ATM component level – treating APW as a component.
3. Sub-system design level – source of hazards.




Figure 5-3: Hazards at boundary of System under assessment

5.7.4 Process

The APW functions specified in the EUROCONTROL Specification were assessed during the FHA. The functional requirement reference number is included in the FHA Tables to provide traceability from the hazards to the functions.

GUIDANCE: It should be noted that the FHA results shown in the Tables below are based on the EUROCONTROL Specification for APW, and are an example only. Inevitably ANSPs will need to refine these based on their own local circumstances, and two examples are included in the Tables. The results of the FHA will be expected to vary considerably with the operating environment, so the FHA should be carried out formally, by qualified ATC and Engineering staff by each ANSP. Controller input to this process is vital in order to ensure that the hazard effects are correctly stated and assigned the appropriate severity.

5.7.5 FHA Results

The FHA results are set out in Table B1-5a. Each of the hazards identified at the ATM Component boundary was assessed for effect on ATM. The severity of the effects was not assessed as this is a matter for ANSPs to determine in the context of their own ATM system. Refer to EATM SAM FHA Guidance Material D⁸ on how to do this. Safety Objectives have been expressed in terms of probability although no values have been assigned (left as To Be Determined (TBD) in Table B1-5a as this is a matter for ANSPs to address.

⁸ EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology - SAM

GUIDANCE: Safety Objectives normally govern the frequency of occurrence of hazards. Whether ANSPs have qualitative or quantitative measures of tolerable occurrence probabilities will depend on their own safety management processes and their regulatory requirements.

Loss of APW merely undermines the success case, and availability (rather than reliability) should be the determining parameter. ANSPs may decide to set a nominal target probability for this hazard taking into account the improvement in detection of hazardous situations attributable to their APW. Thus, if APW was expected to result in a net increase in the number of hazardous situations detected in an airspace volume per year it might be decided that loss of automatic alerts up to 10% of that number per year, per sector will not impact significantly on the safety benefit.

An alternative approach might be to assume a simple linear relationship between net risk reduction attributable to APW and APW availability. It would be reasonable to assume that 90% availability would still constitute a significant safety benefit.

The effects of hazards resulting from the failure case may be quantifiable in the context of a typical risk classification scheme. NOTE that the FHA may define other local requirements that are not covered in the specification.

Hazard Ref: [Req. Ref]	Hazard – Defined at ATM Component Level	Hazard Effect on ATM	Severity & Exposure Time <i>(ANSPS to determine severity by Ref to SAM Severity Classification Scheme)</i>	Mitigation or ATS System factors	Safety Objectives
HA 1	Total loss of APW function: APW alert warnings are not provided to the relevant controllers.	The Controller may not become aware of airspace penetrations. There may be a proportionate increase in the number of conflicts caused by aircraft penetrating restricted or controlled airspace to non APW levels.	Resolution and/or recovery functions slightly impaired for all relevant airspace for the duration of the loss of APW. Possible slight increase in workload or stress, particularly at peak traffic times.	The Controller should be made aware of loss of APW functionality as soon as possible. Radar tracks representation extended to highlight potentially hazardous situations? Need to reinforce with a procedure for the provision of temporary alternative(s) to APW	SO1: The probability of total loss of APW alert warnings shall be no greater than <i>TBD</i> (See <i>SAM FHA Guidance for the right form of words for expressing a safety objective</i>)
HA 2	Anomalous behaviour* of the APW function: APW does not reliably capture and direct controller attention to some airspace penetrations.	The Controller may not become aware of some airspace penetrations. There may be a proportionate increase in the number of conflicts caused by aircraft penetrating restricted or controlled airspace to non APW levels	Resolution and/or recovery functions slightly impaired. Possible slight increase in workload or stress, particularly at peak traffic times.	Although undetected initially, the Controller is likely to detect anomalous behaviour fairly quickly by observing the performance of APW in situations where it would be expected to give an alert.	SO2: The probability of anomalous behaviour of APW shall be no greater than <i>TBD</i>
HA 3	The number of Nuisance Alerts and possible False Alerts (credible corruption) are above an acceptable level.	The Controller's workload may be increased through assessing Alerts for validity. This may distract the Controller to the point that there may be a proportionate increase in the number of aircraft penetrating restricted or controlled airspace to non APW levels.	Resolution and/or recovery functions partially impaired. Possible significant increase in workload or stress, particularly at peak traffic times.	If the number of nuisance Alerts is deemed unworkable the Controller will switch off the APW function	SO4: The probability of the number of nuisance alerts and false alerts exceeding acceptable levels shall be no greater than <i>TBD</i> (See <i>SAM FHA Guidance for the right form of words for expressing a safety objective</i>)
HA 4	The Controller does not react effectively to resolve airspace penetrations detected by APW.	There may be a proportionate increase in the number of conflicts	Resolution and/or recovery functions partially impaired. Possible significant increase in workload or stress, particularly at peak traffic times.	Comprehensive Training and clear understanding of APW operations in relevant airspace.	SO3: The probability that the Controller does not react effectively to resolve airspace penetrations detected by APW shall be <i>TBD</i> (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable)
HA 5	Loss or anomalous behaviour of the ATM surveillance function as a result of APW failures or operation.	Ability to maintain Air Traffic Control is severely compromised within one or more airspace sectors for a significant period of time	Significant reduction in effectiveness of ATC in prevention, resolution or recovery of incidents Possibly through unsustainable increase in workload or operating with incorrect data	ATC procedures are applied to attempt to compensate for the failure.	SO5: The probability of the Loss or anomalous behaviour of the ATM Surveillance function as a result of APW failures or operation shall be <i>TBD</i>

Table B1-5a: APW Functional Hazard Analysis

*Anomalous behaviour: i.e. different from normal behaviour; irregular.

5.7.6 Safety Objectives

The Safety Objectives⁹ are derived from the FHA and are summarised in the Table B1-5b below. These will be decomposed to component-level safety requirements during the design phase PSSA. Each Safety Objective is given a unique identifier (SO1, SO2, etc) and a reference to the hazard (HA1, HA2, etc.) to be mitigated.

GUIDANCE: The Safety Objectives developed by an ANSP will depend on their own FHA results. The Safety Objectives provided in the tables below will need to be adapted by ANSPs to reflect their own analysis. The severity of the hazard effects have not been classified as this is for the ANSP to determine for their own ATM system. Also, the Safety Objectives are incomplete as no probability has been assigned; see SAM FHA for guidance on how to do this. ANSPs may take issue with assignment of a probability to controller action as in SO 3. However, the idea is that the likelihood of a controller not carrying out an action effectively should be reduced as far as reasonably practicable - e.g. through training, effective HMI etc. The probability does not have to be expressed in quantitative terms.

SO Ref (Hazard Ref :)	APW Safety Objectives
SO 1 (HA 1)	The probability of total loss of APW shall be no greater than <i>TBD</i> .
SO 2 (HA 2)	The probability of anomalous behaviour of APW shall be no greater than <i>TBD</i>
SO 3 (HA 3)	The probability of the number of nuisance alerts and false alerts exceeding acceptable levels shall be no greater than <i>TBD</i>
SO 4 (HA 4)	The probability that the Controller does not react effectively to resolve airspace penetrations detected by APW shall be <i>TBD</i>
SO5 (HA 5)	The probability of the loss or anomalous behaviour of the ATM surveillance function as a result of APW failures or operation shall be <i>TBD</i>

Table B1-5b: Safety Objectives

5.7.7 Hazard Causes

The potential causes of the hazards identified during the FHA are investigated here. Safety requirements are set to mitigate the likelihood of the causes occurring (See Safety Plan 7.1.7).

GUIDANCE: Note that the objective here is to determine if there is any safety requirements for APW in addition to those defined in the specification.

⁹ Safety Objective (SO) is a qualitative or quantitative statement that defines the maximum frequency at which a hazard can be accepted. Refer to SAM: Methods for setting safety objectives.

This activity corresponds to the PSSA process described in SAM. Essential pre-requisites for conducting a PSSA include a description of the system, the system architecture; the human roles in the system; a description of the high-level functions of the system and their associated safety objectives and a list of hazards.

GUIDANCE: Some of these pre-requisites have been described previously in this Outline Safety Case, and may vary from those which ANSPs have established for themselves. The list of hazards and safety objectives comes primarily from FHA and is further completed during the PSSA. (See SAM).

The hazard causes were identified with the aid of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and the results are shown on Figure 5-4. The top event in the Fault Tree – “ATM safety *will not be enhanced by APW*” - was selected as the likely outcome of the occurrence of the hazards identified in the FHA.

GUIDANCE: ANSPs will need to establish for themselves the possible hazard causes, however, it is probable that because this Outline Safety Case has used an appropriately-generic logical architecture for an APW system, that Figure 5-4 is re-usable.

5.7.8

Fault Tree Analysis Boundary

The branch of the Fault Tree is made up of the hazards identified in the FHA table B1 -5a. The lower branches show the causes and contributory factors for each hazard (not exclusive).

GUIDANCE: The conventional way of showing fault trees is top down, and formal software tools are available for this purpose. It should be noted that there is no redundancy shown in this fault tree— i.e. all the branches are logical OR, not AND. Thus any of the events shown in the Fault tree can cause the top event independently of the others. That is not to imply that redundancy will be unnecessary at component level. For example, dual processors may be required for both radar and alert processing for reliability purposes.

Although not fully developed here, particularly at APW subsystem level, the fault tree for APW should not need to be much bigger in practice. At most, one more layer at sub component level might be required when developing lower level requirements. E.g. the events that could result in QNH errors could be included and translated into requirements. No probabilities have been assigned to elements of the Fault Tree. ANSPs could attempt to do this to get an estimate of the possible frequency of the top event or to highlight the most likely (dominant) cause of failure.




Figure 5.4 Fault Tree for ATM safety not enhanced by APW




Figure 5.4a Fault Tree for ATM safety not enhanced by APW




Figure 5.4b Fault Tree for ATM safety not enhanced by APW




Figure 5.4c Fault Tree for ATM safety not enhanced by APW




Figure 5.4d Fault Tree for ATM safety not enhanced by APW

5.7.9

APW Safety Requirements

APW Safety Requirements¹⁰ are derived from the Fault Trees. It is necessary to meet these in order to satisfy the Safety Objectives. These are included in the tables below.

GUIDANCE: The safety requirements shown in the tables below are derived from the results of the FHA and the Fault Tree Analysis carried out above. The technical safety requirements relate more to APW availability and operation and ANSPs will have to define the reliability and availability they wish to assign to these, consistent with their safety objectives. The people and procedure safety requirements relate to the mitigation actions from the FHA. ANSPs are likely to have to change the safety requirements stated below based on their own specifications and hazard analysis results.

¹⁰ Safety Requirements are derived from Safety Objectives. Generally, they specify the potential means to mitigate hazards i.e. to prevent occurrence of hazards or reduce the severity of their consequences. Refer to SAM Guidance Material A: Safety Requirements

5.7.10 Technical Safety Requirements

TSL 1 (HA 1)	The probability of the APW Processor failing shall be not exceed (<i>reliability To Be Determined TBD</i>)
TSL 2 (HA 1)	The probability of the Radar Processor failing shall be not exceed (<i>reliability TBD</i>)
TSL 3 (HA 1)	The probability that the automatic alerting mechanism is not capable of alerting controllers in the operational environment shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 4 (HA 2)	The probability that alerts are inadvertently inhibited in relevant airspace shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 5 (HA 2)	The probability that the APW rule set or input data is incomplete or incorrect shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 6 (HA 2)	The probability that eligible types of flight or volumes of airspace are omitted shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 7 (HA 2)	The probability that positional data is credibly corrupt shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 8 (HA 3)	The probability that surveillance data and/or track quality is insufficient for APW purposes shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 9 (HA 3)	The probability of loss or corruption of QNH data input to APW shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 10 (HA 3)	The probability that APW parameters are incorrect shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 11 (HA 4)	The probability that Controllers do not understand the operation of APW for their areas shall be shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 12 (HA 4)	The probability that Controllers fail to maintain awareness of restricted airspace shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i>
TSL 13 (HA 4)	The probability that Controllers do not have a positive attitude to APW shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) <i>TBD</i> .

Table B1-5c Technical Safety Requirements

Note: HA 5 is not included in the above Table as it should be addressed by the host surveillance system.

5.7.11 People and Procedure Safety Requirements

The following safety requirements are intended to react to or prevent some of the failure modes identified in the fault trees – the list is not exhaustive:

PSL 1 (HA 1)	ATC procedures shall state what Controllers should do in the event of loss of an automatic alerting facility such as APW.
PSL 2 (HA 2)	Procedures shall be put in place to ensure that the Controller is advised of any system changes which might degrade the performance of APW
PSL 3 (HA 3)	The action to be taken when the number of nuisance Alerts is above acceptable limits shall be addressed in local instructions/regulations.
PSL 4 (HA 4)	Controllers shall be adequately trained and competent so that the safety benefits of APW can be realised operationally.

Table B1-5d: People and Procedure Safety Requirements

5.8 That which is specified is realistic [Arg 1.6]

The assurance issue here is to verify and validate the requirements with a view to determining the required integrity for the system elements concerned. This is only feasible if the requirements are realistic.

Arg 1.6 - Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Show that the all hazard related aspects of the APW design have been captured as safety requirements or (where applicable) as Assumptions	The safety requirements derived are totally consistent with the EUROCONTROL specification. This is already claimed to be realistic as it is based on the practical experience of the SPIN Task Force. No new functional or non functional requirements were identified via the FHA and FTA processes. Verified by comparison with the EUROCONTROL specification.
(2) Show that the all the safety requirements are verifiable – i.e. satisfaction can be demonstrated by direct means (e.g. testing) or (where applicable) indirectly through appropriate assurance processes.	Judged to be true by review of the requirements, but ANSPs have to assign the integrity requirement.
(3) Show that the all the safety requirements are capable of being satisfied in a typical implementation in hardware, software, people and procedures.	The requirements are already implemented in real APW systems to a greater or lesser extent as determined by the SPIN Task Force.
(4) Show that the all assumptions have been shown to be valid.	Issue for ANSP to address

Table B1-6: Assurance objectives to satisfy Arg 1.6

5.9

The evidence for the safety specification is trustworthy [Arg 1.7]

The Assurance issue is to provide backing evidence that the evidence supporting the arguments 1.1 to 1.6 is trustworthy.

Arg 1.7 - Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Confirm that the assurance processes , tools and techniques used were adequate for the task	<i>ANSP to supply details</i> See Safety Plan 7.1.10
(2) Confirm that the competence of the people using them was adequate for the task	<i>ANSP to supply details</i>

Table B1-7: Assurance objectives to satisfy Arg 1.7

6. APW COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

6.1 Assurance Evidence

Evidence is required from the System Implementation and Integration phase to demonstrate that APW has been implemented in accordance with the specification and that the transition to operational service will be acceptably safe i.e. that **Arg 2** and **Arg 3** can be considered to be true.

GUIDANCE: During this lifecycle phase the detailed design for all aspects of the system is completed (i.e. including people, procedures and equipment), and the system is developed and integrated into the ATM system. Any hazards arising from the planned transfer of the system to operation are identified and appropriate mitigation put in place. All the resources necessary to operate the system are in place.

Assurance evidence from this phase is beyond the strict scope of this Outline Safety Case; actual design assurance will depend entirely on the actual architecture and design adopted by each ANSP. The following parts of this document provide an outline only of the framework for the rest of the safety case.

6.2 APW has been implemented in accordance with the specification [Arg 2]

The overall assurance objective is to show that the system implements the functional, non-functional and safety requirements relating to equipment, people and procedures correctly and completely.

6.2.1 Strategy

The strategy is to show that all functional, non-functional and safety requirements have been translated into design requirements and implemented successfully. This requires that evidence is available to satisfy the sub arguments 2.1 to 2.4 as shown in Diagram B2 below. Each of these is considered here, but to a very limited extent only given the scope of the Outline Safety Case.




Diagram B2: System Implementation and integration Argument

6.3 The Technical System is designed to meet the safety requirements [Arg 2.1]

GUIDANCE: A documented design is required, which is under configuration control and shown to be complete and correct. It will show how the functional requirements have been incorporated. It will outline how APW works e.g. see below. It will contain detail descriptions (or references to documents containing these) of the APW algorithms and filters etc. (See Safety Plan 7.2.1 and 7.2.2).

Arg 2.1 - Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Confirm that the design requirements interpret the specification completely and correctly.	<i>Results of review of the design documents</i>
(2) Confirm that the design is documented and under configuration control	<i>ANSPs to identify design documents, and issue reference – to be referenced in the safety case.</i>
(3) Confirm that the design incorporates all the requirements, completely and correctly,	<i>ANSPs to provide a brief explanation of how this has been verified</i>
(4) Confirm that appropriate hardware, software and human Assurance Levels are developed (HWAL, SWAL etc.) Ref: Eurocontrol SAM.	<i>Assurance levels specified in the safety case.</i>

Table B2-1: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 2.1

6.4

The Technical System is implemented and integrated as designed [Arg 2.2]

GUIDANCE: Assurance that the technical system has been implemented in accordance with the design will be intimately dependent on the actual design, the implementation and the processes. Assurance is likely to be made up of evidence from the engineering processes followed, the results of testing, and controller-in-the-loop simulations (See Safety Plan 7.2.2).

The APW algorithms are complex and are likely to be difficult to verify completely using simple functional tests. Test scenarios based upon extracts from recordings of real radar data might be used and the resulting data compared an off-line model. Evidence may be available from a corrective action system based on reported defects.

The operational performance of APW is likely to be highly dependent upon the correct choice of adaptation (i.e. adapted for the procedures in use in the relevant volumes of airspace). This is likely to iterate during development and testing, and may again provide evidence of evolutionary correctness.

The achievement of more subjective requirements such as controller acceptability and usability is likely to be obtained in controller-in-the-loop simulations and trials.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that overwhelmingly compelling evidence is available without the collection of in-service data – where APW will be operating in the real operational environment. In service monitoring and adaptation will probably need to be carried out. This may affect the initial operational use of the APW system

Arg 2.2 - Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Confirm that the system meets the specified functional and performance safety requirements.	<i>Consider each of the safety requirements in turn and provide evidence that they have been met.</i> See list of assurance activities in the Safety Plan at 7.2.2.
(2) Confirm that the APW functions correctly and coherently under all normal conditions	<i>Results of assurance activities included in the Safety Case</i>
(3) Confirm that the APW is robust against external abnormalities.	<i>Results of assurance activities included in the Safety Case</i>
(4) Confirm that appropriate design and assurance standards have been followed i.e. IEC12207 (SW Lifecycle Processes), ED109/DO278 (SW Assurance Standard) to facilitate compliance with ESSAR 6 (and related Single European Sky Commission Regulation (EC) No 482).	<i>Assurance levels, and results of assurance activities included in the Safety Case</i>

Table B2-2: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 2.2

6.4.1

Functional and non-functional requirements: Design Assurance

The functional and non-functional requirements from the EUROCONTROL APW specification are listed here.

For each of the following requirements provide details of how each has been met in the design, procedures, training with reference to supporting evidence as appropriate.

APW 01: The ANSP **shall** have a formal policy on the use of APW consistent with the operational concept and safety management system applied to avoid ambiguity about the role and purpose of APW.

APW 02: The ANSP **shall** assign to one or more staff, as appropriate, the responsibility for overall management of APW.

GUIDANCE: Despite the fact that developing an APW may appear as a purely technical exercise, it is of paramount importance that the system is fit for the purposes of the specific operational context and consistent with the safety policy established inside the ANSP. In all ANSP organisations an adequate flow of information between engineering and operational staff is constantly required, especially in the tuning and validation phases.

APW-03: The ANSP **shall** ensure that all controllers concerned are given specific APW training and are assessed as competent for the use of the relevant APW system.

APW-04: Local instructions concerning use of APW **shall** specify, *inter alia*:

a) the types of flight (GAT/OAT, IFR/VFR, etc.) which are eligible for generation of alerts;

- b) the volumes of airspace within which APW is implemented;
- c) the method of displaying the APW to the controller;
- d) in general terms, the parameters for generation of alerts as well as alert warning time;
- e) procedures for and methods of defining and activating/deactivating volumes of airspace;
- f) the volumes of airspace within which APW can be selectively inhibited and the conditions under which this will be permitted;
- g) conditions under which specific alerts may be inhibited for individual flights; and
- h) procedures applicable in respect of volumes of airspace or flights for which APW or specific alerts have been inhibited.

APW 05: In the event an alert is generated in respect of a controlled flight, the controller shall without delay assess the situation and if necessary take action to ensure that the required spacing to that airspace volume will not be infringed or will be restored. If that is not possible the controller shall take action to mitigate the consequences of the unauthorised penetration.

APW 06: APW performance shall be analysed regularly to identify possible shortcomings related to APW.

APW 07: APW shall detect and alert operationally relevant situations for eligible aircraft.

APW 08: APW shall provide alerts for operationally relevant situations.

APW 09: APW alerts shall attract the controller's attention and identify the aircraft involved in the situation; APW alerts shall be at least visual.

APW 10: The number of nuisance alerts produced by APW shall be kept to an effective minimum.

APW 11: The number of false alerts produced by APW shall be kept to an effective minimum.

APW 12: When the geometry of the situation permits, the warning time shall be sufficient for all necessary steps to be taken from the controller recognising the alert to the concerned aircraft successfully executing an appropriate manoeuvre.

APW 13: APW shall continue to provide alert(s) as long as the alert conditions exist.

APW 14: APW shall provide the possibility to inhibit alerts for predefined volumes of airspace and for individual flights.

APW 15: Alert inhibitions shall be made known to all controllers concerned.

APW 16: Status information shall be presented to supervisor and controller working positions in case APW is not available.

APW 17: All pertinent APW data shall be made available for off-line analysis.

APW A1: The rule set and alerting strategy should be determined taking into account the relevant system boundaries and environmental functions.

6.4.2

Technical System Safety Requirements: Design Assurance

The safety requirements derived from the PSSA are listed here. Evidence is to be supplied by ANSPs as outlined in italics. Refer to the Safety Plan 7.2.2 for information on the tools and techniques that may be relied on for assurance purposes.

For each of the following safety requirements describe the evidence available to demonstrate that they are met.

TSL 1: The probability of the APW Processor failing shall be not exceed (*reliability To Be Determined TBD*)

TSL 2: The probability of the Radar Processor failing shall be not exceed (*reliability TBD*)

TSL 3: The probability that the automatic alerting mechanism is not capable of alerting controllers in the operational environment shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 4: The probability that alerts are inadvertently inhibited in relevant airspace shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 5: The probability that the APW Rule set or input data is incomplete or incorrect shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 6: The probability that eligible types of flight or volumes of airspace are omitted shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 7: The probability that positional data is credibly corrupt shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 8: The probability that surveillance data and/or track quality is insufficient for APW purposes shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 9: The probability of loss or corruption of QNH data input to APW shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 10: The probability that APW parameters are incorrect shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 11: The probability that Controllers do not understand the operation of APW for their areas shall be shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 12: The probability that Controllers fail to maintain awareness of restricted areas shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*

TSL 13: The probability that Controllers do not have a positive attitude to APW shall be (e.g. reduced as far as reasonably practicable) *TBD*.

6.5

APW Procedures Designed and Implemented to Meet the Requirements [Arg 2.3]

GUIDANCE: Procedures for the operation of APW will need to be defined to ensure that operational requirements are met. Evidence will need to be presented that the combination of environment, the procedures and the design of the equipment together ensure that the requirements are met.

Reversionary procedures will also need to be defined for those circumstances where APW is not performing correctly.

Evidence will need to be presented to show that those procedures have been implemented (See Safety Plan 7.2.3).

Arg 2.3 - Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Confirm that procedures have been designed to meet the safety requirements	<i>Consider each of the safety requirements in turn and provide evidence that they have been met.</i> See the illustrative example below. See Safety Plan activities 7.2.3
(2) Confirm that the procedures have been implemented.	<i>Provide evidence that this has been done</i>

Table B2-3: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 2.3

6.5.1

Procedure Safety Requirements

The safety requirements derived from the PSSA are listed here. Evidence is to be supplied by ANSPs as outlined in italics. [Refer: Safety Plan 7.2.3].

For each of the following safety requirements describe the evidence available to demonstrate that they are met.

PSL 1: ATC procedures shall state what Controllers should do in the event of loss of an automatic alerting facility such as APW.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:

The procedures have been designed taking full cognisance of the controllers and engineers point of view and related human factor issues. A Human factors expert has been consulted in the process to ensure that there is limited scope for ambiguity in understanding in the procedures.

The procedures have been implemented and integrated into the ANSP documentation set as designed.

PSL 2: Procedures shall be put in place to ensure that the Controller is advised of any system changes which might degrade the performance of APW

PSL 3: The action to be taken when the number of nuisance Alerts is above acceptable limits shall be addressed in local instructions/regulations.

6.6

Training Courses for Controllers and Engineers designed and implemented to meet the requirements [Arg 2.4]

The safety requirements derived from the PSSA are listed here. Evidence is to be supplied by ANSPs as outlined in italics. [Refer: Safety Plan 7.2.4].

GUIDANCE: Evidence will need to be presented to show that any training necessary for controllers or engineers to be able to operate and maintain the equipment has been identified, appropriate training courses developed, and that staff has successfully completed those courses.

Arg 2.4 - Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Confirm that the training courses have been designed to meet the requirements	<i>Consider each of the safety requirements in turn and provide evidence that they have been met.</i> See Safety Plan activities 7.2.4
(2) Confirm that the training courses have been implemented.	<i>Provide evidence that this has been done</i>

Table B2-4: Assurance Objectives to Satisfy Arg 2.4

6.6.1

People Safety Requirements

For each of the following safety requirements describe the evidence available to demonstrate that they are met.

PSL 4: Controllers shall be adequately trained and competent so that the safety benefits of APW can be realised operationally.

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:

Training courses for operation and maintenance of APW have been designed and documented (include document references). Controllers and Engineers have been trained and are deemed to be competent to operate the system and procedures. Training courses for controllers and engineers have been implemented as designed.

6.7

Transition of APW to operational service will be acceptably Safe [Arg 3]

6.7.1

Assurance Evidence

The overall assurance objective is to show that the existing ATM system will not be put at risk during the transition to operation of APW and that all the resources necessary for the safe operation of the system are in place – people, procedures and equipment. This requires that evidence is available to satisfy the Sub Arguments 3.1 to 3.3 as shown in Diagram B3 below. Each of

these is considered here, but to a very limited extent only given the scope of the Outline Safety Case.




Diagram B3: Safe Transition to Operational Service

Arg 3 - Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Show that safety requirements for the transfer to operation have been specified	<i>Describe the steps take to ensure that existing ATM system will not be put at risk during the transition to operation of the APW system. See Safety Plan activities 7.3.1 and illustrative example below.</i>
(2) Confirm that the system reliability and integrity accepted as meeting the functional and performance safety requirements.	<i>Include here a summary results of functional tests carried out during commissioning, in so far as they address safety.</i>
(3) Confirm that the HF and HMI accepted as satisfactory	<i>Provide summary of the evidence confirming acceptability and how it was demonstrated.</i>
(4) Confirm that the sufficient trained staff available to operate and maintain the system.	<i>Provide evidence that all the resources necessary for the safe operation of the system are in place – people, procedures and equipment.</i>
(5) Confirm that the procedures are published and promulgated to all relevant staff. These should include procedures for switch over to operational service, and any associated contingency.	<i>Provide summary of the evidence confirming this.</i>
(6) Confirm that the operational validation trials satisfactory	<i>Provide summary of the evidence confirming this.</i>
(7) Confirm that the system shortcomings highlighted and accepted for operation.	<i>Provide summary of the evidence confirming this.</i>
(8) Confirm that the regulatory approval to operate obtained.	<i>Provide summary of the evidence confirming this.</i>

Table B3: Assurance objectives to satisfy Arg 3

6.7.2

Safety Requirements for the Transfer to Operations Specified [Arg 3.1]

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE:

A safety assessment has been carried out to ensure that the existing ATM system will not be put at risk during the integration and transfer to operations of APW - people, procedures and equipment included. The assessment was made to identify any potential hazards that might need to be mitigated during that phase of activity.

The assessment involved relevant ATC and engineering staff. The main hazard highlighted was that the new software might be run inadvertently in the operational radar system causing to fail. The resulting safety requirement relates to ensuring that the part of the ATM system being worked on is completely isolated from the operational system during this phase. This activity must be reinforced by management supervision and control.

GUIDANCE: Safety requirements must be defined associated with managing the risks to the ongoing ATC operations resulting from putting the APW into operation. These safety requirements will result from a hazard analysis of the technical and operational impacts of the transfer to operations.

This section is likely to comprise a list of the hazards (and a rationale that they indeed are the hazards), an analysis of the hazards for their impact on the operation, and a series of transition requirements developed to manage the risk down to a tolerable level (See Safety Plan 7.3.4).

7. SYSTEM OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

7.1 The Safety of APW will continue to be demonstrated in operational service (Arg 4)

7.1.1 Assurance Evidence

The assurance issue is to ensure that APW is maintained and operated consistent with the requirements of Criteria 01.02 and 03. This requires that its performance is optimised for all areas of application. [Ref: Safety Plan Activity 7.4.1].

GUIDANCE: APW status information is continuously monitored and Controllers are advised of any changes that might affect the system performance. APW performance is monitored and analysed to ensure that it does not degrade and that it continues to satisfy ANSP safety objectives.




Diagram B4: Safety in Operational Service

Arg 4 – Assurance Objectives	Evidence Summary
(1) Confirm that the Staff have been assigned with the responsibility for management of APW (to fulfil the above functions)	<i>Provide summary of the evidence</i>
(2) Confirm that the a formal process exists for monitoring APW Status	<i>Provide summary of the evidence</i>
(3) Confirm that the a formal process exists for monitoring APW and analysing the results	<i>Provide summary of the evidence</i>
(4) Show that the system remains optimised for its role and keeps pace with changing operational requirements	<i>Provide summary of the evidence</i>
(5) Show that ATC are advised of any system changes that might affect the safety performance	<i>Provide summary of the evidence</i>
(6) Show that maintenance procedures are in place and are fit for purpose	<i>Provide summary of the evidence</i>

Table B4: Assurance objectives to satisfy Arg 4

8. CONCLUSIONS

Conclude with a statement that the top-level argument has been satisfied, subject to the caveats below – assumptions, shortcomings, limitations and outstanding safety issues. Provide a quantified level of the degree of the net safety benefit provided, if possible.

GUIDANCE: Further guidance on Safety Case conclusions can be found in the EUROCONTROL SCDM [Ref 8].

8.1 Assumptions

List any key assumptions that have had to be made in the safety case, or underlying safety assessment. Explain why these assumptions have had to be made and why it is believed that the assumptions are valid (or at least reasonable).

8.2 Limitations and shortcomings

GUIDANCE: Include here any design or operational shortcomings or limitations, including any identified through the testing, installation and integration into the Air Traffic Service.

8.2.1 Shortcomings

List here any cases where the safety requirements have not been met, or where there is limited confidence that they have been met. For each case, determine and justify

whether the overall safety objectives are compromised by the failure to meet the requirement.

GUIDANCE: For example, if there were circumstances under which a large number of erroneous alerts being displayed that would represent a shortcoming against the requirements.

8.2.2 Limitations

For each shortcoming that has an operational impact, identify the nature of that impact, the residual risk it represents, and any agreed operational mitigations that could be put in place to reduce that risk. Confirm that the ANSP has accepted the limitation and the need for the mitigation.

8.3 Outstanding Safety Issues

GUIDANCE: List any outstanding issues that need to be resolved before the safety case can be considered to be completed. Show what actions need to be, preferably have been, put in place to resolve them.

9. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ANSP	Air Navigation Service Provider
APW	Area Proximity Warning
Conops	Concept of operation
ECIP	European Convergence and Implementation Plan
ESARR	EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement
FHA	Functional Hazard Assessment
FTA	Fault Tree Analysis
GSN	Goal-Structuring Notation
HF	Human Factors
HMI	Human Machine Interface
NSA	National Supervisory Authority
PSSA	Preliminary Safety Assessment Process
SAM	Safety Assessment Methodology
SMS	Safety Management System
SO	Safety Objective
SPIN	Planning Implementation and eNhancements (Task Force)
SPIN	Safety nets Performance Improvement Network (Sub Group)
SRC	Safety Regulation Commission
SSA	System Safety Assessment
SCDM	Safety Case Development Manual

10. REFERENCES

1. EUROCONTROL Specification for Area Proximity Warning
2. EUROCONTROL Guidance Material for Area Proximity Warning
3. EUROCONTROL Guidance Material for Area Proximity Warning; Appendix A: Reference System.
4. Safety Assessment Made Easier Version 0.92
5. SRC Action paper SRC28/06. SRC Policy on Ground Based Safety Nets
6. SPIN: Survey of Practices in Safety Nets; Summary report Edition 1.01
7. SCDM: EUROCONTROL Safety Case Development Manual, Edition 2.2
8. EUROCONTROL ESARR 4 – Risk Assessment and Mitigation, Edition 1.0

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