SAM Toolkit
The EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) is a framework, a toolbox containing methods and techniques to carry out safety assessment of changes to the functional systems of the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP). It was developed in the noughties of the 21st century as means of compliance to ESSAR 4.
The objective of the methodology is to support the provision of assurance of the safety of the Air Traffic Services (ATS) provided by an ANSP. It covers the entire system/change life cycle: specification, design, implementation, integration, transfer into operation and operation and maintenance. The assessment process includes Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) and a System Safety Assessment (SSA).
SAM is organised in three levels: level 1 explains the "what", level 2 provides details on "how" to perform a safety assessment and level 3 provides real life examples from ANSPs and the industry.
Although there have been many changes in the regulatory framework in Europe and elsewhere, SAM is still relevant and can be used for risk assessment and mitigation purposes.
SAM Toolkit filters
SAM Level
SAM Step
Project Manager Profile
Project Safety Manager Profile
Safety Practitioner Profile
Showing below 27 results in range #1 to #27.
Level 1
FHA
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
The objective of the FHA initiation step is to develop a level of understanding of the system, its operational environment and, if appropriate, its regulatory framework, sufficient to enable the safety assessment activities to be satisfactorily carried out.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
The objective of the FHA Evaluation step is to demonstrate that the FHA process meets its overall objectives and requirements. The Evaluation is carried out in three stages: Verification, Validation and Process Assurance.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
The objective of the FHA Completion step are the following: recording of the results after the completion of the FHA process and dissemination of these results to all interested parties.
PSSA
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
The objectives of the PSSA Initiation step are to develop a level of understanding of the system design and its rationale, to update the description of the operational environment and, when appropriate, to identify the regulatory requirements and/or standards applicable to the system design.
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
The objective of the PSSA Evaluation is to demonstrate that the PSSA process meets its overall objectives and requirements. The Evaluation is carried out in three stages: Verification, Validation and Process Assurance.
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
PSSA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
The objectives of the PSSA Completion step are the following: recording of the results after the completion of the PSSA process and dissemination of these results to all interested parties.
SSA
SSA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
SSA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
The objectives of the SSA Initiation step is to develop a level of understanding of the system development, implementation, operation, maintenance and decommissioning and its rationale, to update the description of the operational environment and to identify, when appropriate, the regulatory requirements and/or standards applicable to the system implementation, integration, transfer into operation, operation, maintenance and decommissioning.
SSA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
SSA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
The objective of this SSA Evaluation step is to demonstrate that the SSA process meets its overall objectives and requirements. The Evaluation is carried out in three stages: Verification, Validation and Process Assurance.
SSA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
SSA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
This document’s objectives are the following: recording of the results after the completion of the SSA process and dissemination of these results to all interested parties.
PART IV
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX H – “what is a change”
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX H – “what is a change”
This annex proposes means to assess whether a change in the Air Navigation System deserves a safety assessment or not.
Level 2
PART IV
PART IV V2-1 ANNEX A-B-C – Acronyms, Glossary, Initial Safety Palnning
PART IV V2-1 ANNEX A-B-C – Acronyms, Glossary, Initial Safety Palnning
This annex proposes Acronyms (Annex A), Glossary (Annex B) and Safety Planning ‘as a whole’ (i.e. including FHA, PSSA, SSA) Preliminary Guidance Material.
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX D – Safety Techniques Survey
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX D – Safety Techniques Survey
This annex provides guidance for practical and effective use of Safety Techniques and Methods to achieve some parts of SAM step. These Safety Techniques cover the overall SAM (FHA, PSSA and SSA) lifecycle.
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX D (REPORT) – Safety Techniques Survey - Report
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX D (REPORT) – Safety Techniques Survey - Report
This annex presents the main results of a survey conducted, aimed at collecting and evaluating techniques and methods that can be used to support the guidelines of the EATMP Safety Assessment Methodology.
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX D (TECHNICAL ANNEX) – Safety Techniques Survey - Technical Annex
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX D (TECHNICAL ANNEX) – Safety Techniques Survey - Technical Annex
This annex proposes the technical annex to the report presented in “Part IV Annex D (Core) – Summary of the Review of techniques to support EATMP Safety Assessment”.
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX E – Recommendations for ANS SW
This document is kept for information purpose only and has been replaced in 2009 by ED153PART IV V1-0 ANNEX E – Recommendations for ANS SW
This annex provides a reference against which stakeholders can assess their own practices for software specification, design, development, operation, maintenance and decommissioning as well as recommendations on the major processes required to provide assurance for software in Air Navigation Systems. This annex provides recommendations on the major processes required to provide the appropriate level of safety and quality assurance for software in Air Navigation Systems.
PART IV V3-0 ANNEX F – ANS Software Lifecycle
This document is kept for information purpose only and has been replaced in 2009 by ED153PART IV V3-0 ANNEX F – ANS Software Lifecycle
As a companion to Annex E, this annex defines a recommended SW lifecycle and identifies the objectives/activities/tasks required by each referred standards and describes their commonalities and differences.
PART IV V0-1 ANNEX G – Safety Assessment of ATM Procedures (SAAP)
PART IV V0-1 ANNEX G – Safety Assessment of ATM Procedures (SAAP)
This annex supplements the ANS Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) by providing specific guidelines related to the performance of safety assessments of ATM procedures. The guidelines focus on PSSA step of the SAM and provide guidance to elaborating safety requirements and allocating the procedures assurance level (PAL).
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX G APPENDIX B – SAAP-Example
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX G APPENDIX B – SAAP-Example
This annex is part of SAAP and illustrates it with its application to Helsinki Vantaa Independent Parallel Approach procedure.
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX I CORE SCDM – Safety Case Development Manual
PART IV V2-0 ANNEX I CORE SCDM – Safety Case Development Manual
This annex provides explanations on different types of Safety Cases (Project Safety Case, Unit Safety Case and Preliminary Safety Case) and proposes a manual for their construction and development.
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 1 – HAZOP & TRACEr
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 1 – HAZOP & TRACEr
This annex gives an overview of an independent comparison of two human error analysis techniques – HAZOP and TRACEr-lite – for the three projects: Co-Space, Time-based Separation and CORA2. The report presents the high-level findings of the Co-space study and compares the performance of the techniques over all three applications.
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 2 (ANNEX) – HAZOP & TRACEr-Example
PART IV V1-0 ANNEX J CORE 2 (ANNEX) – HAZOP & TRACEr-Example
An independent comparison of two human error analysis techniques – HAZOP and TRACEr-lite – was performed for the three projects: Co-Space, Time-based Separation and CORA2. The annex report presents the detailed analysis performed for each study.
PART IV V3-0 ANNEX K CORE – Fault Tree Analysis
PART IV V3-0 ANNEX K CORE – Fault Tree Analysis
This document provides guidance to apply Fault Tree Analysis in the framework of the Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM), for both PSSA (Preliminary System Safety Assessment) and SSA (System Safety Assessment).
Level 3
FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX A – Examples of functional hazard assessments
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX A – Examples of functional hazard assessments
The purpose of this chapter is to provide several examples (OLDI, CPDLC, SMGCS) of application of the Hazard Assessment part (Chapter 3 sub-steps 1 to 3) of the FHA process.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX B – Example of TLS apportionment method: en-route airspace
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX B – Example of TLS apportionment method: en-route airspace
This document presents a worked example of the application of the TLS Apportionment to a typical block of EUR en-route airspace – we deleted the confusing part (Method 1).
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX C – Safety Objective Classification Scheme (SOCS) examples
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX C – Safety Objective Classification Scheme (SOCS) examples
This document proposes examples of Safety Objective Classification Scheme for several projects (ATCC building, Link 2000+, CORA2).
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D – ATCC Building FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D – ATCC Building FHA
This appendix explains the context of usage of the Appendix D Core – ATCC building FHA.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D CORE – ATCC building system safety assessment - FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D CORE – ATCC building system safety assessment - FHA
This document provides guidance material for identifying Safety Objectives for an ATCC Building.
