SAM Toolkit
The EUROCONTROL Safety Assessment Methodology (SAM) is a framework, a toolbox containing methods and techniques to carry out safety assessment of changes to the functional systems of the Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP). It was developed in the noughties of the 21st century as means of compliance to ESSAR 4.
The objective of the methodology is to support the provision of assurance of the safety of the Air Traffic Services (ATS) provided by an ANSP. It covers the entire system/change life cycle: specification, design, implementation, integration, transfer into operation and operation and maintenance. The assessment process includes Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA), Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) and a System Safety Assessment (SSA).
SAM is organised in three levels: level 1 explains the "what", level 2 provides details on "how" to perform a safety assessment and level 3 provides real life examples from ANSPs and the industry.
Although there have been many changes in the regulatory framework in Europe and elsewhere, SAM is still relevant and can be used for risk assessment and mitigation purposes.
SAM Toolkit filters
SAM Level
SAM Step
Project Manager Profile
Project Safety Manager Profile
Safety Practitioner Profile
Showing below 29 results in range #1 to #29.
Level 1
FHA
FHA v2-1 Intro – Introduction
FHA v2-1 Intro – Introduction
This document introduces the objectives of a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) as well as the various steps which constitute the FHA. These steps are described in subsequent documents. The main objectives of the FHA are to identify hazards, to assess the consequences of their occurrences on the safety of operations and to set- their maximum acceptable frequency of occurrence (Safety Objectives).
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 – Initiation
The objective of the FHA initiation step is to develop a level of understanding of the system, its operational environment and, if appropriate, its regulatory framework, sufficient to enable the safety assessment activities to be satisfactorily carried out.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Planning
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 – Planning
The objective of the FHA planning step objective is to the define objectives and scope of the FHA, the activities to be carried out, their deliverables, their schedule and the required resources.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 – Safety Objectives Specification
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 – Safety Objectives Specification
The objectives of the FHA Safety Objectives Specifications step are the following: identification of all potential hazards associated with the system, identification of hazard effects on operations, assessment of the severity of hazard effects and specification of Safety Objectives.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 – Evaluation
The objective of the FHA Evaluation step is to demonstrate that the FHA process meets its overall objectives and requirements. The Evaluation is carried out in three stages: Verification, Validation and Process Assurance.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 – Completion
The objective of the FHA Completion step are the following: recording of the results after the completion of the FHA process and dissemination of these results to all interested parties.
Level 2
FHA
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
FHA V2-0 Chapter 1 GUIDANCE A – Operational Environment Definition
This guidance material helps defining the operational environment and describing the characteristics which may be relevant when assessing the safety impact of the loss or degradation of the new/modified system’s functions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 GUIDANCE A – Planning FHA activities
FHA V2-0 Chapter 2 GUIDANCE A – Planning FHA activities
This document describes the generic activities and the associated planning of the FHA.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A – Planning and conducting FHA session
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A – Planning and conducting FHA session
This guidance material provides recommendations to conduct sessions to identify hazard and its worst credible effects.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A Facilitator Pack (PPT) – Facilitation helpful hints
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE A Facilitator Pack (PPT) – Facilitation helpful hints
This guidance material provides recommendations to facilitate FHA brainstorming sessions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B1 – Identification of failure modes, external events and hazards
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B1 – Identification of failure modes, external events and hazards
This guidance material provides definitions and examples on identification of different types of failure modes, external events and hazards.
FHA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B2 – Identification of Hazards
FHA V2-1 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE B2 – Identification of Hazards
This guidance material provides information on how to perform hazard identification brainstorms. Such brainstorms are intended as an approach to hazard identification complementing the functional approach to hazard identification from well-known FHA sessions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Identification of hazards effects
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE C – Identification of hazards effects
This guidance material provides information on a "Cause-Consequence" approach which is proposed in order to determine the effects of the loss or degradation of system functions.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE D – Severity Classification Scheme
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE D – Severity Classification Scheme
This guidance material provides some hints for practical and effective use of the Severity Classification Scheme within the FHA stage. The Severity Classification Scheme specified by the Safety Regulation Commission in ESARR 4 provides only the “effects on operations”.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE E – Risk Classification Scheme
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE E – Risk Classification Scheme
This guidance material provides specifications regarding the maximum acceptable and tolerable frequencies of occurrence of an (hazard) effect of a certain severity class per reference unit (flight hour, operational hour, per sector, etc.). This guidance material is further detailed into EUROCAE ED125.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE F – Safety Objective Classification Scheme
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE F – Safety Objective Classification Scheme
This guidance material provides specifications regarding the maximum acceptable frequency of occurrence of a hazard per reference unit (flight hour, operational hour, per sector, etc.) taking into account the severity of the worst credible hazard effect (amongst all hazard effects).
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE G – Methods for setting Safety Objectives
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE G – Methods for setting Safety Objectives
This guidance material proposes methods to define the Safety Objectives, which are qualitative or quantitative statements that define the maximum frequency at which a hazard can be accepted to occur.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE H – Results records
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE H – Results records
This guidance material provides templates in the form of tables as support of the recording of the assessment of hazards and of Safety Objectives.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE I – Barrier Analysis
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE I – Barrier Analysis
This Guidance Material provides information on one possible way to perform a barrier analysis for ATM.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J – TLS apportionment method
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J – TLS apportionment method
This guidance material proposes a method for the quantification of Safety Objectives and the apportionment of Target Level of Safety. Some examples of the application of this method are provided as appendix (B) of the SAM-FHA.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J CORE – TLS apportionment method
FHA V2-0 Chapter 3 GUIDANCE J CORE – TLS apportionment method
This guidance material proposes a method for apportioning the ESARR 4 TLS (for events of severity category 1) to ATM systems and setting numerical Safety Objectives to events of severity categories 2 to 4.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 GM A-B-C – FHA Evaluation Activities
FHA V2-0 Chapter 4 GM A-B-C – FHA Evaluation Activities
This guidance material provides guidance on verifying and validating a Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) in the form of multiple checklists – we rephrased it today.
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 GM A – FHA Report
FHA V2-0 Chapter 5 GM A – FHA Report
This guidance material proposes a template to report the FHA process. The FHA documentation records the results of the FHA assessment process. This document will be updated through the complete system life cycle.
Level 3
FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX A – Examples of functional hazard assessments
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX A – Examples of functional hazard assessments
The purpose of this chapter is to provide several examples (OLDI, CPDLC, SMGCS) of application of the Hazard Assessment part (Chapter 3 sub-steps 1 to 3) of the FHA process.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX B – Example of TLS apportionment method: en-route airspace
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX B – Example of TLS apportionment method: en-route airspace
This document presents a worked example of the application of the TLS Apportionment to a typical block of EUR en-route airspace – we deleted the confusing part (Method 1).
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX C – Safety Objective Classification Scheme (SOCS) examples
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX C – Safety Objective Classification Scheme (SOCS) examples
This document proposes examples of Safety Objective Classification Scheme for several projects (ATCC building, Link 2000+, CORA2).
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D – ATCC Building FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D – ATCC Building FHA
This appendix explains the context of usage of the Appendix D Core – ATCC building FHA.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D CORE – ATCC building system safety assessment - FHA
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX D CORE – ATCC building system safety assessment - FHA
This document provides guidance material for identifying Safety Objectives for an ATCC Building.
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX E_V5 – Examples of derivation of safety targets for NAV application – methodology
FHA V2-0 APPENDIX E_V5 – Examples of derivation of safety targets for NAV application – methodology
This document proposes a method for developing TLSs for a full matrix of accident categories and flight phases for navigation application purposes. If a NAV project/application wants to concentrate on ATM specific causes of risk, a method for further partitioning these TLSs is proposed.
