

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Program Office

Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X) Overview

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Date: June 10-11, 2014




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Mission Need (TCAS II Performance Review)

Safety


- No U.S. commercial air carrier collisions since mandate
- Numerous TCAS saves
 - “...TCAS saved our lives.” - Pilots
- Mid-air collision risk reduced by 90%



Operational Suitability

> 80% of alerts occur during intentional, safe operations



- Most cause minimal disturbance to pilots



Performance monitoring assessment shows that TCAS works as intended but alerts during many normal, safe operations



Challenges for TCAS II in the Future




Future Airspace	TCAS Challenges
Additional surveillance information available	Tightly tuned to transponder-based surveillance, difficult to incorporate ADS-B
Reduced procedural separation	Alerting thresholds difficult to adjust without compromising safety
CAS for other user classes	Alerting logic not easily adaptable beyond current TCAS users

- **TCAS will not easily support new demands for flexibility and efficiency**
- **Difficult to accommodate new user classes such as general aviation and unmanned systems**



TCAS Upgrade Challenges




- Pseudocode is compilation of deterministic rules and heuristics
- Alerting criteria is tightly coupled to transponder surveillance performance
- Modifying alerting criteria or rules to address specific performance issues is difficult due to interdependencies



ACAS X Introduction

Airborne Collision Avoidance System

- ACAS X – An interoperable expansion of a family of aircraft collision avoidance systems developed for use in NextGen airspace
- Provides the same general role as TCAS II:
 - Surveillance of nearby aircraft
 - TA/RA Generation
 - Coordination with other aircraft collision avoidance systems
- Supports New Capabilities:
 - Leverages Additional Surveillance Sources
 - Intended for multiple types of host aircraft
 - Tunable for Reduced Separation Operations




ACAS X Program

Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS X)

- **FAA initiated formal research in 2009**
 - Decision theoretic safety logic
 - Flexible surveillance tracker
- **Benefits**
 - Enables reduced separation
 - Fewer unnecessary alerts
 - Extends to new user classes
 - Easier to adapt to changing airspace

ACAS X supports NextGen airborne collision avoidance requirements



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ACAS X Threat Logic


State Uncertainty



Imperfect sensor information leads to uncertainty in position and velocity of aircraft

Probabilistic sensor model

Dynamic Uncertainty



Variability in pilot behavior makes it difficult to predict future trajectories of aircraft

Probabilistic dynamic model

Multiple Objectives



System must carefully balance both safety and operational considerations

Multi-objective utility model

Optimal logic produced from probability and utility models




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ACAS X Alerting is Different Than TCAS


Legacy TCAS

Step 1: Is there a hazard?




Alert if time to closest approach and projected miss distance are below thresholds

Step 2: Climb or descend?



Choose sense that maximizes miss distance

Step 3: What altitude rate?



Choose the lowest vertical rate predicted to achieve required separation

ACAS X

Step 1: State Distribution



Estimate ~10M states based on beliefs about own and intruder dynamics

Step 2: Look-Up Table

```

•00000101010111000000
1110101101111100011
0011101100011011001
1110011101110110110
1010010000110010111
1011111011001011110
0111111011011010000
0100010111011000101
1100100001111000110
    
```

For each state estimation, look up expected cost related to available actions

Step 3: Choose action with lowest cost

No Alert	0.8
Level-off	0.1
Descend	0.9
Climb	0.2

Choose the action resulting in the lowest cost



How ACAS X and TCAS Alerts are Modified

Legacy TCAS

Assumed behavior




Change assumptions of own and intruder aircraft behavior

Thresholds

- $\tau = 40 \text{ sec}$ ~~35 sec~~
- $Z_{thr} = 600 \text{ ft}$ ~~400 ft~~
- $ALIM = 300 \text{ ft}$ ~~250 ft~~

Establish new alert criteria


Rules



Change existing pseudo code

ACAS X

Dynamics



Modify weights of belief states and state transitions

Offline costs

- NMAC (-1)
- Alert (-0.01)
- Reversal (-0.01)
- Strengthen (-0.009)
- Clear of conflict (0.0001)

Change the reward values for alerting parameters

Online costs



Alert inhibit altitude




Used actual parameters live on aircraft



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TCAS Logic Development

Legacy TCAS Development Cycle



- Human effort focused on pseudocode

- Time-consuming process
- Many parameters require tuning
- Unlikely to be optimal

```

PROCESS Reversal_modeling;
.
.
.
NOMINAL_SEP = 0;
Z = G.ZDOWN;
ZD = G.ZDOWN;
DELAY = 0;


IF (G.OWN_FOLLOW EQ FALSE)
.
.
.
THEN CALL MODEL_SEP
.
.
.
IN (DELAY, ZD, Z, ZD, P.VACCEL, OWN_TENT(7), ITF_ZINT, ITF_ZDINT, ITF_entry)
.
.
.
OUT (NOMINAL_SEP);
.
.
.
IF (OWN_TENT(7) EQ $TRUE)
.
.
.
THEN NEW_SENSE = $FALSE;
.
.
.
ELSE NEW_SENSE = $TRUE;
.
.
.
IF (NOMINAL_SEP GT 1.2 * P.CROSSTHR)
.
.
.
THEN CLEAR ITF_REVERSE;
.
.
.
ELSE
.
.
.
Begin own is assumed to follow its RA>
.
.
.
IF (OWN_TENT(5,6) EQ '00')
.
.
.
THEN DELAY = MAX(P.TV1 - (G.TCUR - G.TPOSRA), 0);
.
.
.
IF (OWN_TENT(7) EQ $FALSE)
.
.
.
THEN ZDGOAL = MAX(MIN(G.ZDOWN, P.MAXDRATE), P.CLMRT);
.
.
.
ELSE ZDGOAL = MIN(MAX(G.ZDOWN, P.MINDRATE), P.DESRT);
.
.
.
CALL PROJECT_VERTICAL_GIVEN_ZDGOAL
.
.
.
IN ((G.TCUR - G.TPOSRA), G.ZTV, G.ZDTV, ZDGOAL, P.TV1, P.VACCEL)
.
.
.
OUT (ZPROJ, ZDPROJ);
.
.
.
IF (((OWN_TENT(7) EQ $FALSE AND ZPROJ GT G.ZOWN AND
.
.
.
(G.ZDOWN GE G.ZDTV - P.MODEL_ZD)) OR
.
.
.
(OWN_TENT(7) EQ $TRUE AND ZPROJ LT G.ZOWN AND
.
.
.
(G.ZDOWN LE G.ZDTV + P.MODEL_ZD))) AND
.
.
.
G.TCUR - G.TPOSRA LT P.MODEL_T)
.
.
.
THEN Z = ZPROJ;
.
.
.
ZD = ZDPROJ;
.
.
.
CALL MODEL_SEP
.
.
.
IN (DELAY, ZDGOAL, Z, ZD, P.VACCEL, OWN_TENT(7),
.
.
.
ITF_ZINT, ITF_ZDINT, ITF_entry)
.
.
.
OUT (NOMINAL_SEP);
.
.
.
IF (OWN_TENT(7) EQ $TRUE)
.
.
.
THEN NEW_SENSE = $FALSE;
.
.
.
ELSE NEW_SENSE = $TRUE;
.
.
.
DELAY = MAX(P.TV1 - (G.TCUR - G.LASTNEWRA), P.QUICKREAC);
.
.
.
IF (NEW_SENSE EQ $FALSE)
.
.
.
THEN ZDGOAL = MAX(P.CLMRT, MIN(G.ZDOWN, P.MAXDRATE));
.
.
.
ELSE IF (G.NODESCENT EQ $TRUE)
.
.
.
THEN ZDGOAL = 0;
.
.
.
ELSE ZDGOAL = MIN(P.DESRT, MAX(G.ZDOWN, P.MINDRATE));
.
.
.
IF (G.REV_CONSPRD EQ $FALSE)
.
.
.
THEN IF ((ITF_INT_CROSS EQ $TRUE) OR (ITF_ZDINT EQ 0 AND
.
.
.
ITF_RZ GT 0) OR (ITF_ZDINT * G.ZDMODEL LT 0))
.
.
.
THEN MZDINT = ITF_ZDOUTR;
.
.
.
ELSE MZDINT = ITF_ZDINR;
.
.
.
ELSE MZDINT = ITF_ZDINT;
.
.
.
CALL MODEL_SEP
.
.
.
IN (DELAY, ZDGOAL, Z, ZD, P.VACCEL, NEW_SENSE, ITF_ZINT, MZDINT, ITF_entry)
.
.
.
OUT (ZMP);
.
.
.
IF (ZMP LE 0 OR NOMINAL_SEP GE G.ALIM)
.
.
.
THEN CLEAR ITF_REVERSE;
.
.
.
End own is assumed to follow its RA>
END Reversal_modeling;

```



ACAS X Logic Development


Model-Based Optimization Approach




- Human effort focuses on defining performance metrics
- Computers generate lookup table
- Optimal, robust logic




ACAS X Architecture



Program Segments and Work Packages






ACAS-X Tuning Process



- **ACAS-X tuning accomplished via supervised optimization**
 - Analysts specify initial objective function and automated tuning performs search producing candidate logics
 - Automated search is periodically interrupted and analyst preferences incorporated via an updated objective function



Safety Results




EE: Run 12 performance improves upon Run 11, exceeds TCAS
EU: Run 12 performance exceeds TCAS



Overall Alert Rate

12







BACKUP



X_A – Active Surveillance
 X_O – Operation Specific
 X_U – Unmanned Aircraft System
 X_P – Passive Surveillance

ACAS X Variants

		User Group	Surveillance Technology	Advisories
Useful Segment 1	 ACAS X_A	Current TCAS II users (large aircraft)	Active radar supplemented with passive	Same as current TCAS II
	 ACAS X_O	Users of specific operations (e.g., CSPO, Formation Flights, ASAS Operations)	Active radar supplemented with passive	Procedure-specific alerts for selected aircraft, global alerting against all others
NextGen Concept Maturation	 ACAS X_U	Unmanned aircraft (controlled airspace)	Potentially radar, EO/IR, etc.	“Coordinated” vertical advisories
	 *ACAS X_P +	General aviation, etc.	Passive only	Reduced advisory set

