



For a “1309 System Approach” of the “Conflict Management”



**Airborne Conflict Safety Forum
Eurocontrol 10/11 June 2014**

How Conflict Management is Handled Today

- **IN CONTROLLED AIRSPACE**

Strategic and tactical separation provided by the ATCo

Collision avoidance is provided by the pilots

ICAO Annex 2 : *"It is important that vigilance for the purpose of **detecting potential collisions** be not relaxed on board an aircraft in flight ...*

FAR 91-113 : *... "vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to **see and avoid** other aircraft... (FAR 91-113)*

TCAS is considered as a "Safety Net"

- **IN NON CONTROLLED AIRSPACE**

Pilots are in charge to assume "separation and so collision avoidance"

AC 90-48 C is there to remember pilots

..that most MAC accidents and NMAC incidents occurred during good VFR weather conditions and during the hours of daylight."

- **CONCLUSIONS**

Conflict management is handled by application of operational rules

There is no "safety analysis, no common failure mode detection"

Today Operations In Controlled airspace

Separation

**ATM
Controller**

Method

Aircraft position from secondary radar
Distance : mode A transponder
Azimuth : Radar bearing
Altitude : Mode C transponder

Collision Avoidance

**Aircraft
Pilots**

Method

By visual contact
See & Avoid principle

"Safety net"
TCAS

No analysis of the Common failure modes

What Means “1309 System Approach”?

- **SYSTEM APPROACH**

To refer to the method developed for certification of the aircraft systems (FAR/CS 25/23)

It's a comprehensive examination of the system functions to identify failures modes

Consequences of the failure conditions are classified in categories

Minor, Major, Hazardous, Catastrophic

Failures modes are analyzed (safety analysis) ; associated probabilities are determined

In CS/FAR 25 (large aircraft) catastrophic event is set at 10-9/h

In FAR 23 Classe I (Single Reciprocal Engine) catastrophic event is set at 10-6/h

- **WHY “1309”**

Because it is the paragraph number used the CS/FAR to request such analyses

There are also AC/AMC to better defines the rules & methods

AC/AMC 25-1309

AC 23-1309-1D

A New Concept for ATM Safety

- **THE CONCEPT JUSTIFICATIONS**

It will no longer be possible to separate on board functions & activity from ATC ones

Due to the function integration a global approach based on complex system will be required

- **CONCEPT FOR “AIRCRAFT SEPARATION & COLLISION AVOIDANCE”**

There is a need for a complete new approach of aircraft separation / collision avoidance

A concept based on technology and no longer on physiologic pilot capacities

"See & avoid" no longer considered as the primary means of collision avoidance

A concept considering a global approach of the problem (Ground & airborne segments)

A concept based on safety objectives (1309 minded), validated by safety analyses

A concept considering and analyzing all common failure modes

- **WHY SUCH A CONCEPT**

To allow safe operation of all types of aircraft : Civil (large to ultra light), UAS, State

To replace “uncontrolled airspace”, by “controllable airspace”

To select and validate the systems used for separation & collision avoidance

The Method

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graph BT; CSO[Collision Safety Objective] --> OR{OR}; OR --> CFMA[Common Failure Mode Analysis]; OR --> AND{AND}; AND --> LOS[Lack of Separation]; AND --> CER[Collision Event Risk]; AND --> LCA[Lack of Collision Avoidance]
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The diagram illustrates the methodology for achieving a Collision Safety Objective. It is structured as follows:

- Collision Safety Objective** (Top level, blue box)
- OR** (Intermediate level, green octagon)
- Common Failure Mode Analysis** (Right side, blue box)
- AND** (Intermediate level, green octagon)
- Lack of Separation** (Bottom left, green box)
- Collision Event Risk** (Bottom center, blue box)
- Lack of Collision Avoidance** (Bottom right, red box)

The flow is indicated by arrows: from the top objective down to the OR gate, from the CFMA box to the OR gate, from the OR gate down to the AND gate, and from the AND gate to the three bottom-level boxes (Lack of Separation, Collision Event Risk, and Lack of Collision Avoidance).

DASSAULT AVIATION
DIRECTION TECHNIQUE CERTIFICATION

SL2014-08 System Approach Conflict Management Eurocontrol 140610.ppt

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Aircraft System Safety Objectives

- **CASTASTROPHIC EVENT PROBABILITY IN AVIATION (one scenario)**

- $10^{-9}/h$: Transport aircraft (CS 25) or commuter (FAR23)
- $10^{-8}/h$: Aircraft over 6000 lbs (FAR 23) (VLJ aircraft)
- $10^{-7}/h$: Single turbine Engine or Multi reciprocating engines (FAR 23)
- $10^{-6}/h$: Single reciprocating engine (FAR 23), Combat Aircraft, Large UASs
- $10^{-5}/h$: *Ultra light machines, Gliders, VLA, UASs (less than 4000 lbs)*

- **CATASTROPHIC AIRCRAFT LOSS (Global)**

- $10^{-7}/h$: System Global objective for Transport aircraft (CS 25)
 $10^{-6}/h$: *taking into consideration all factors (ATM, MMI, Weather) (reality slightly better : $3 \cdot 10^{-7}/h$)*
- $10^{-6}/h$: System Global Objective for Transport Aircraft (CS23 ,VLJ)
- $10^{-5}/h$: System Global Objective for General Aviation (CS/FAR 23)
- $10^{-5}/h$: System Global Objective for Combat Aircraft

Note : Italic to indicate that these figures are extrapolated from Regulations

Future Controlled Airspace

- **TOMORROW SEPARATION**

ATC remains in charge of aircraft separation (ADS-B)

ATC might delegate separation activity to pilots (ADS-B ASAS)

- **COLLISION AVOIDANCE**

No longer based on “see & avoid” but on “TCAS” technology (mode S)

See & Avoid becomes the “safety net”

- **COMMON FAILURE MODES**

Altitude baro (ADS-B et mode C/S)

Solution is to receive intruder GPS / Baro altitude difference and to compare it with onboard one
1090ES frequency saturation (ADS-B & mode S used by the TCAS)

Solution : avoid saturation and even in the future adopt UAT technology (RTCA recommendation)

The pilot himself which will be in charge of separation & collision avoidance

Solution : In case of TCAS TA & RA, to remove all ASAS symbology


ADS-B : Automatic Dependence Surveillance System

TCAS : Traffic Collision Avoidance System



ASAS : Airborne Separation Assistance System

TA : Traffic Alert

RA : Resolution Advisory



ASAS with Wake Vortex Symbolology



Uncontrolled Airspace

- **PREREQUISITES**

- All the users have to become “cooperative” and so have to report positions (ADS-B)

- Technologies will have to be adapted to the users (1090ES, UAT, FLARM, GSM...)

- TIS (Traffic Info Service) broadcast to all users

- Various means of transmission (UAT, GSM, WiMax in airport area)

- FIS (Flight Info Service) to provide all the necessary information

- “Dynamic Airspace Allocation” can be used in real time to provide “advisory separation” to a user

- Uncontrolled airspace will become “controllable airspace” (controlled by the users)

- **SEPARATION & COLLISION AVOIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE USERS**

- Risks will have to be determined and accepted by the users

- Collision risk in light aviation is high today, technology will be a real plus to reduce the risk

- See & avoid will remain an element of safety (safety net)

- Access to local airports for Business Aviation & even light Air transport

- Advisory separation provided by “Remote Tower” & “Dynamic Airspace allocation”

- Self separation based on the fact that all users are now cooperative

- Associated risk will nevertheless be higher than in controlled airspace

Safety is Paramount for all the Users

- **SAFETY IN ALL THE AIRSPACE**

Controlled airspace as today uncontrolled airspace

Safety based more on technology than on application of “operational rules”

Elimination of “common failure modes”

- **SAFETY FOR ALL THE USERS**

Meaning that all the users have to become “cooperative”

ADS-B technologies have to be adapted to user specificities

“See & Avoid” no longer the main principle of separation & collision avoidance

- **UAS ARE COMING**

They have to find their ways to operate

All the other users have to consider them

THE BEST WAY TO PREDICT THE FUTURE IS TO CREATE IT

Peter Drucker

Questions?

