



Safety Evolution Guide:

Sharing serious ATC related incidents, SoE 17.3 Safety Communication

LVNL

An Evolution Guide for an SMS practice which has been recognised as Optimised by the CANSO Safety Standing Committee

1. OBJECTIVE OF GUIDE

Members of the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO) are committed to the improvement of their services. As part of this commitment, organisations share their practices in efforts transfer learning across the industry.

This guide captures:

- The practices of an Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) in one element of the CANSO Standard of Excellence (SoE) in Safety Management System (SMS). The practices of this ANSP have been recognized by their peers as being an optimised practice within the industry (see Figure 1). The optimised practices have been selected on the basis of their novelty, innovation or the recognition of their potential to manage operational risks.



Application of the Guidance

CANSO recognizes that this guidance will not be relevant to all ANSPs. The maturity of any ANSP's Safety Management System will be dependent on their specific context. This context will be a reflection of factors including the size and complexity of the organisation, domestic regulations and the risk appetite of the organisation.

ANSPs do not necessarily need to adopt all the practices and processes promoted by CANSO but may consider the relevance of the practices promoted in this guide to their operational environment.

2. OPTIMISED PRACTICE

This guide addresses an SMS process which was identified in 2019 and 2019 as being optimised, it details how one Air Navigation Service Provider, LVNL, is actively sharing serious ATC related incidents on their website. The approach was reviewed by a panel of experts from the Optimised Review Group of the Safety Standing Committee. The approach meets CANSO's requirements for SoE in SMS Study area 17.3 (see below).

3. SCOPE OF GUIDE

This guide aims to provide an insight into what LVNL has done in the initiative of sharing serious ATC related incidents on their website, and details why this approach was taken. Examples of the type of activities are included throughout this guide to provide a starting point for other ANSP's wishing to facilitate a similar development sharing information with industry stakeholders.

4. APPLICABLE STANDARDS AND REQUIREMENTS

CANSO Standard of Excellence in Safety Management Systems

17.3 Appropriate safety information and knowledge is shared with industry stakeholders

Objective	Informal Arrangements	Defined	Managed	Assured	Optimised
17.3 Appropriate safety information and knowledge is shared with industry stakeholders. Information disclosure complies with agreed publication and confidentiality policies / agreements.	Safety data and information are treated as confidential. There are no plans to disseminate it to any industry stakeholders.	The organisation shares safety data and information externally using informal processes.	When required by regulation, the organisation shares safety data and information nationally.	The organisation encourages the proactive sharing of safety-related information with other parties (including industry stakeholders) to drive safety improvement.	The organisation has set best practice(s) for safety management for this objective and is willing to share those with other ANSPs/organisations.

Extract from CANSO Standard of Excellence in Safety Management Systems

[https://www.canso.org/system/files/CANSO Standard of Excellence in Safety Management Systems.pdf](https://www.canso.org/system/files/CANSO%20Standard%20of%20Excellence%20in%20Safety%20Management%20Systems.pdf)

5. CONTEXT

In 2014, the Eurocontrol Just Culture annual conference was held at LVNL, Schiphol. At that conference, LVNL presented an analysis of how the organisation communicated to the external world over the past decades and how it wanted to set a further step in communicating to the general public, as part of a broad-spectrum Safety Culture and Just Culture approach.

One of the steps in this approach is the publication of all our serious incidents on our public website. This has been achieved and LVNL's serious incidents are since listed on our public website, see <https://www.lvnl.nl/en/about-us/safety-at-lvnl.html>.

This initiative, independent from any publications by the official national Accident Investigation Board, was generally very well received by local and international press and hailed as example that all organisations like LVNL (e.g. rail, energy) in The Netherlands

should follow. International organisations like Eurocontrol have repeatedly pointed at the example for other ANSPs to follow.

6. IMPLEMENTATION

Publication criteria

The occurrences that LVNL announces to the public are related to the performance of the task assigned to LVNL. This means that we publish occurrences that take place under the responsibility of air traffic control, and do not publish about technical or operational aspects involving aircraft and/or the airports. The occurrence must also have been reported to the Dutch Safety Board (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid - OVV). Examples include:

- Loss of distance, or loss of minimum separation, also known as a conflict;
- Take-off from or landing on a runway not in use or an occupied runway, or from a runway not assigned by air traffic control;
- Runway incursion with actual or potential risk of collision.

The severity categories of occurrences have been established by ICAO. The categories are: serious, major and significant. The category for each occurrence is stated after the investigation. In the event of an aviation accident (involving material damage, injuries and/or casualties), LVNL will not publish any report on what happened.

How the reports are published

Reports are published in two steps:

1. Report of an occurrence: as soon as possible, and in any case within five working days. This report contains basic information about the date and nature of the occurrence. Prior to publication, LVNL has formally notified all authorities (including the Dutch Safety Board), assessed the criteria for publication (such as estimating the severity of the occurrence), collected the information, and notified the organisations involved that publication will take place.
2. Results of the investigation: detailed description of the situation, conclusions of the investigation and any follow-up. After completion of the investigation, LVNL will publish a factual description of the occurrence and its conclusions. If applicable, measures taken by LVNL will also be added, e.g. changes in systems or procedures, or additional communication to operational staff.

When a new notification is reported or when the results of the investigation are published, this is communicated via a news item and an announcement on Twitter. The duration of an investigation depends on the situation and the parties involved. Thorough and careful is always more important than fast.

Description of occurrence

Boeing does a go-around

A Boeing 777 aircraft was approaching from the east for a landing on the Buitenveldertbaan runway (runway 27). There was a strong northwesterly wind. The cockpit was warned to expect 'wind shear' (a strong downward air current that can push the aircraft downwards) Subsequently, the pilots decided to do a go-around well before landing and reported this to the tower controller. The tower controller answered in confirmation and ordered them to climb to 3,000 feet (approximately 1,000 meters). At an altitude of 3,000 feet, the Boeing turned right to line up for the runway again. The tower controller transferred communication with the aircraft to the radar controller.

Embraer approaches the Buitenveldertbaan runway

After the go-around by the Boeing, an Embraer E175 aircraft was the next to land at the Buitenveldertbaan runway. The aircraft flew on a straight approach to the runway and descended to 2,000 feet (approximately 600 meters). The radar controller was planning to have the Boeing line up behind the Embraer for the landing on the Buitenveldertbaan runway. The Boeing was flying eastward with a strong tailwind, and therefore came closer to the Embraer than intended. The air traffic controller instructed the Boeing to turn to the left, thus restoring the separation with the Embraer.




Figure 1 - Excerpt from lvnl.nl

7. RESULTS

After five years in operations the principle of publicising serious and major safety events on our website is well accepted practice with our controller community, with positive feedback from them. Also their awareness of serious / major incidents and the public consequences has been raised, assisting in an improved safety culture. Also, incidents that we publish ourselves tend to receive no or very limited media attention, as the 'source' itself reveals the data.

It is known that since this initiative, also PRORAIL, the organisation for the railways infrastructures, has followed the example and publishes investigation reports of their more significant safety events.

The register on the public website is still maintained and updated and is e.g. used by the prosecution's office to check and verify that reported incidents are actually followed up, increasing the trust in the effectiveness of our safety management system, ultimately resulting in a stand-off attitude in case of incidents that have not resulted into damage to goods or persons. We have sometimes questions from the Dutch Accident Investigation Board that are initiated by our publications on our website.

As a result of this initiative, external stakeholders are informed and appreciate the transparency, which further strengthens our Just Culture efforts and relationship with the authorities and judiciary office.

9. SUMMARY

The practices in this guide present an example of how one ANSP has initiated the sharing of serious ATC related incidents on their website. The strategy sets out a number of steps that can be undertaken with various stakeholders to facilitate such an initiative.