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European Cockpit Association

Pilots as a Resource for System Resilience

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European Cockpit Association (ECA)

**“The representative
voice of Europe’s airline
pilots towards the EU
institutions“**



Our mission

ECA represents the **collective interests** of its Member Associations at European level, striving for the highest levels of **aviation safety** and **fostering social rights** and **quality employment** for pilots in Europe.



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Overview

1. Motivation
2. ECA Survey *“Pilots as Resource for System Resilience”*
3. Analysis so far
4. Involvement in-/Cooperation with other Organizations
5. Next Steps



Why this survey?

- **Safety II**
 - Added focus on “things that go right”
- **Resilience** *“ability of systems to anticipate and adapt to the potential for surprise and failure”*
(Hollnagel, Woods, Leveson – 2006)
- **Resilience Engineering** *“a paradigm for safety management that focuses on how to help people cope with complexity under pressure to achieve success”* (Hollnagel et al. – 2006)



Why this survey?

- **Flight Safety Foundation Webinar (2020) & Whitepaper (2021)** *“Learning from all Operations”*
- **Presentations**
 - **E. Hollnagel** *“Is Safety Really Enough?”*
 - **J. Holbrook** *“How Safety Thinking Impacts Safety Learning: Creating Opportunities to Learn”*



Survey “Pilots as Resource for System Resilience”

- **Survey “Pilots as Resource for System Resilience” (2021)**
- **Goal: why, when, how pilot actions contribute to the day-to-day success in commercial air transport operations**
- **Help to determine potential “core-areas of interest”**



Survey “Pilots as Resource for System Resilience”

Survey Team Members:

Cpts Damiano De Tomassi, Maria Murtha, Michael Petry, Rudy Pont, Max Scheck, SFOs Niklas Ahrens, Veronica Schömer, and Johannes Bade, LL.M.

1 → **Type of occurrence:**

We are looking for events where your creativity and resilience was needed.

You can choose only one option here. If you would like to report any more occurrence, please take the survey again.

☐ **A Inappropriate Standard Procedures:** Click here if you or your crew ever had to go beyond the normal or non normal procedures to maintain safe operations.

☐ **B Inappropriate Automatic System Behavior:** Click here if you or your crew ever had to intervene manually because an automatic system either failed or did not function appropriately to the situation.

☐ **C Operational Issues:** Click here if you or your crew ever had to intervene because operational processes did not work as intended.



Survey „Pilots as Resource for System Resilience“

- Some survey Limitations
 - Open questions, resulting responses varied significantly
- ⇒ focus more on qualitative, rather than quantitative analysis



ECA Survey Quantitative Results

Quantitative Analysis:


Total responses: 1611

Usable reports: 1428

77% referred to Inappropriate
Automated System Behavior

12% Operational Issues


11% Inappropriate Standard
Procedures



Inappropriate Automatic System Behavior

1037 of the 1095 reports relating to Automated System Behavior referred to a particular system, with:


- **Auto-Flight Systems** by far the most often reported (804 \triangleq 78%)
- **followed by Navigation Systems** (90 reports \triangleq 9%)



Inappropriate Automatic System Behavior


Of the 1095 reports relating to Automated System Behavior 69 ($\triangleq 6\%$) included “**Weather Elements**” at the time of the event

- vast majority (62 $\triangleq 90\%$) referred to wind/ turbulence



Inappropriate Automatic System Behavior


In 73% of reports relating to disconnection of an automated system (total 426 reports), the crew decided to disconnect the system while there were no direct indications by the respective system



Inappropriate Automatic System Behavior

Combination of Flight Phase at Start of Event (if included in the report) were reported predominantly for “Approach” and “Climb/Descent” (188 and 118 respectively).

However, 38 reports ($\approx 10\%$) referred to the cruise phase of the flight.




ECA Survey Quantitative Results

Operational Issues

Total 173 reports relating to Operational Issues:

- **24% refer to ATC and/or clearance issues**
- **22% refer to loading and/or PAX final figures issues**
- **12% refer to dispatch (flight planning) issues**
- **42% refer to Other issues**



Operational Issues

- Overall number of reports on Standard Procedures relatively small, thus the team considered any quantitative analysis to be of limited use
- Instead: qualitative analysis using ‘Grounded theory’
 - By means of induction, the text from the narrative reports would be used as the basis to formulate a theory
 - There are three steps involved in this process:
 - (1) - Open coding (labeling)
 - (2) - Axial coding (aggregating labels - classification)
 - (3) - Selective coding (theory building - abstraction)




ECA Survey Qualitative Analysis

Operational Issues

A "demonstration-run" was conducted and resulted in an initial set of 345 sample codes for step one (Open Coding). These were then combined (aggregated) into the following five categories:

- Consequences
- Flight phase
- Human adaptivity (Safety-II)
- Operational context (Safety-I)
- Regions

Three members of the survey team are currently completing the EUROCONTROL Weak Signals Course



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Involvement & cooperation with other organizations

- **ICAO Personnel Training and Licensing Panel**
 - Automation Dependency Subgroup
 - Competency-Based Training and Assessment Subgroup
 - Flight Simulation Training Devices Subgroup
- **EASA**
 - Various Expert Panels/Stakeholder Advisory Boards
 - Rule Making Tasks (RMTs)
 - e.g., RMT230 (*Regulatory framework to accommodate unmanned aircraft systems in the European aviation system*)
- **Other Organizations**
 - DLR, NLR, EUROCONTROL



Involvement & cooperation with other organizations

- **Flight Safety Departments of Operators**
- **Academia**
 - ESMT Berlin
 - TU Berlin
 - University of Frankfurt
 - La Sapienza University Rome (cooperation with EUROCONTROL “Weak Signals Project”)



Next Steps

- **Intensify qualitative analysis**
 - Participation in EUROCONTROL Weak Signals Course
 - Conduct interviews
 - Qualitative analysis using Grounded Theory
 - Continue exchange with academia and other organizations
- **Seek cooperation with EASA's Data4Safety (potentially also with FAA's ASIAs)**
 - Run data-queries to see if operational data confirms results of survey
- **Liaise with Flight Safety Departments of Operators to cross-feed information and exchange ideas**
- **Perhaps conduct follow-up survey(s)**



Next Steps

Potential questions resulting from the quantitative and qualitative analyses so far:

(1) How do you gain enough data to adequately capture the operational environment?

a. What data is/should be looked at?

(2) How do crews make the decision to override/switch-off the automation?

a. Is this decision-making process adequately captured/reflected in the current training curricula?



Next Steps

Potential questions cont'd:

(3) What are the reasons that current aircraft mostly use pilots as primary backup measures for insufficient automated system-behavior?

a. Cost?

b. Technical feasibility?

(4) How is the influence of wind and turbulence modelled within the design process of autopilot filters?



Pilots as a Resource for System Resilience

Thank You!

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