

# Just Culture development at Irish Rail

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# Why we started this...

## Safety Leadership Training

The screenshot shows a slide from a Safety Leadership Training module. The slide has a blue header with the text 'Safety Leadership Training'. Below the header is a white section containing the logos of the European Union Agency for Railways (a blue square with white lines and the text 'EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR RAILWAYS') and Iarnród Éireann Irish Rail (a green and orange diamond shape with the text 'Iarnród Éireann Irish Rail'). The main content area is white and features the text 'Module 4. Just and Fair Treatment' in a large, bold, blue font. Below this, in a smaller blue font, is the subtitle 'How to treat deviations in a just and fair manner?'. At the bottom of the slide, there is a blue footer bar with the text 'Module 4' on the left and 'Page 10' on the right.

## EVOLUTION OF RESPONSES TO SPADs

Traditionally: written warning + 6 months on jobs confined to depots


Currently: medical appointment + mandatory 2 year training plan + excluded from career progression

Drivers don't feel fairly treated following a safety incident – and are not inclined to report them

# How we started...

HR-led working group

Decision tree and incident case studies



Module 4  
Just and Fair Treatment

A.      B.      C.

Incident: SPAD at shunt signal

During degraded working, an out of service train was turned around mid-section by the signaller who controlled one of the protecting signals. A local informal agreement was in place whereby the PICOP contacted the local signaller, who then changed ends and drove the train towards the next main aspect signal, passing a shunt signal at danger. No route was set for the train, but when the signaller thought his train was holding the route for the full section...

Incident: Tilt irregularity

A possession was granted without the knowledge of the CTC signaller who controlled one of the protecting signals. A local informal agreement was in place whereby the PICOP contacted the local signaller, who then changed ends and drove the train towards the next main aspect signal, passing a shunt signal at danger. No route was set for the train, but when the signaller thought his train was holding the route for the full section...

Incident: Possession break by RRV

An RRV operator was unfamiliar with the location of the works and had no knowledge of the points to off-track. The Rule Book requires that RRVs are accompanied by a PIC when travelling and off-tracking. No PIC was sent with the RRV. The PICOP instructed the RRV to leave site had no access to PICs with road knowledge and was unfamiliar with the area. The RRV operator was unfamiliar with the access point. He sent the RRV unaccompanied in an attempt to avoid delays handing the site back.

Incident: Near-miss in station platform

A CMC staff member and contractor servicing discharge equipment on a platform were not in a position of safety when a train arrived. The SSOWs in place for CMC staff to work on the platform did not advise the work being done when no trains were present, so appropriate protection was not in place for the workers.

Incident: Level crossing cleared with vehicle inside

Two cars were initially trapped inside the barriers. The operator raised the barriers to let the second (silver) car through and did not notice the second darker car, which was partially obscured by the road traffic light for the level crossing. The operator sent the RRV to clear the crossing once the first car was clear with the second still trapped inside.

Incident: Level crossing cleared with pedestrian inside

A level crossing was cleared with a pedestrian inside the barriers. The pedestrian was in a readily identifiable location. The CMC staff was not identified by the operator. Following the incident, the crossing controller tested positive for a prohibited substance.

Module 4  
Just and Fair Treatment

D.      E.      F.

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I remember:

- ✓ Reporting is fundamental for safety improvement
- ✓ Leaders play a major role in the development of an environment of trust that favours reporting
- ✓ Trust is hard to establish, and easy to break
- ✓ Therefore it is necessary to have a transparent process to treat gaps in a just and fair manner
- ✓ Errors happen
- ✓ The human contribution to safety is firstly positive

Incorporate case studies in safety leadership training

Externally facilitated workshop with executive team

# Current position



Concept has gained traction, particularly with frontline staff



Hired a full-time Safety Culture Coordinator to drive the initiative forward



Set up a senior level steering group



Holding consultations with different manager groups



‘Drip feeding’ the concept at different organisational forums



Started making changes to some of the SMS standards and processes

# Some of the issues raised



Legal challenge – not removing someone from a grade could leave the manager open to challenge if they are later involved in an accident

Legal advice: removing them from the grade for an error could leave the company open to an unfair dismissal case



Legal challenge – identifying systems issues in an accident where a staff member was injured could reinforce their compensation claim

Legal advice: not identifying and addressing systems issues which resulted in an accident leaves the company open to a larger claim if someone else is injured



Perception of what the next level of management wants

All levels feel like the level above them want to hear action taken after an incident



Feeling exposed – managers need to feel supported in the event of making a wrong decision

# Errors so far...



System improvement was too implicit



Account for organisation churn



Focus on frontline behaviours



Too little early senior management engagement



Not acknowledging where we have come from

# What's worked

## Stories and scenarios

- Worked examples, from simple and straightforward to complex and difficult

## Changing the SMS

- Formalise the expectations of manager behaviours post-incident, providing them support

## Consulting widely

- Reassurances from legal and regulatory agencies that they see no major issues with this approach

## Word of mouth

- Staff who have been treated under a (semi) Just Culture approach are giving positive feedback to their colleagues

# Next steps

1

Set of HF and systems-thinking tools for investigators

2

Adapt incident templates to focus more on learning

3

Progress workshop with the exec team

4

Comms and training

5

Launch event?



Thank You

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