Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft
Confédération suisse
Confederazione Svizzera
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Swiss Confederation

Büro für Flugunfalluntersuchungen
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Aircraft accident investigation bureau

Final Report No. 1905 of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

concerning the incident (Airprox)

between AFR5825 and N83CP

on 16 September 2004

Region of La Tour-du-Pin (LTP/VOR)

Bundeshaus Nord, CH-3003 Bern

FINAL REPORT

AIR TRAFFIC INCIDENT REPORT (ATIR)

AIRPROX (NEAR MISS)

PLACE/DATE/TIME	Region of La Tour-du-Pin (LTP/VOR), 16 September 2004, 18:31 UTC
AIRCRAFT	AFR5825, CRJ100, F-GRJK, BRITAIR Lyon St-Exupéry (LFLL) – Rome Fiumicino (LIRF)
	N83CP, GLF5, private flight New York La Guardia (KLGA) - Geneva (LSGG)

CREWS	AFR5825	CMDR FO
	N83CP	CMDR FO

ATC UNIT	Swiss Radar Area West, Terminal Control; Initial Approach South INS
CONTROLLERS	Arrival Sector PRE
	Initial Approach South INS

AIRSPACE	D

HISTORY

On Thursday 16 September 2004, at 18:31:57, the pilot of aircraft N83CP, a private flight from New-York – La Guardia (KLGA) to Geneva, was handed over by Marseille Control to Geneva and called on the ARRIVAL sector control frequency.

The aircraft was in the region of La Tour-du-Pin (LTP/VOR), at flight level FL 160. The pilot was cleared by the radar controller direct to point INDIS for a straight-in approach on runway 05, at flight level FL 160. The pilot of flight N83CP asked the ARRIVAL radar controller to repeat the point to which he was cleared, without reading back the flight level. The ARRIVAL radar controller then gave him a heading of 025 degrees and the pilot read back this clearance.

At 18:32:07, the pilot of aircraft AFR5825, a scheduled flight between Lyon-St-Exupéry and Rome, by the BRITAIR company, called the Geneva Initial South control sector (INS). The pilot was cleared by the radar controller to change to flight level FL 150 on the route PENAR - RISOR. The controller informed him of traffic just above him. This was flight N83CP.

The routes followed by the two aircraft intersected perpendicularly in the region of the La-Tour-du-Pin VOR.

According to his statements, the pilot of aircraft N83CP thought he was cleared to descend to flight level FL 130 and began his descent. He repeated the clearance to maintain flight level 160.

At 18:32:27, the ARRIVAL radar controller issued essential traffic information to the pilot of aircraft N83CP, who replied that he had contact with the traffic. The pilot received the confirmation to maintain flight level FL 160. He then asked for confirmation that he was in fact to maintain flight level FL 160 and the radar controller again confirmed this clearance.

Despite these urgent instructions and during their transmission, the crew of aircraft N83CP began their descent to flight level FL 130, to which the pilot, according to his statements, believed he was cleared.

When the two aircraft were at a lateral separation of 4.7 NM and an altitude difference of 700ft, on converging headings, the Short Term Conflict Alert (STCA) was activated on the controller's radar screen. According to the radar plot, aircraft N83CP was at flight level 156.

The INS radar controller immediately issued essential traffic information to the pilot of aircraft AFR5825, who replied that he was following his TCAS.

Less than ten seconds later, when the routes of the two aircraft were still converging and the separation reducing, the ARRIVAL radar controller instructed the pilot of aircraft N83CP to climb immediately to flight level FL 160, issuing him with further essential traffic information.

The ARRIVAL radar controller asked the pilot of aircraft N83CP if he had the traffic in sight. The pilot replied that he was at flight level FL 160, adding that he was obeying a TCAS resolution advisory.

Aircraft N83CP then carried out a steep climb, passed flight level FL 160 for which he was cleared and continued to climb to flight level FL 171.

The pilot of aircraft AFR5825 reported to the INS radar controller that he was submitting an AIRPROX report to his company, to which the controller replied that he was doing the same.

The ARRIVAL radar controller informed the pilot of aircraft N83CP that the ATC unit was submitting an ATIR report following this incident.

All times indicated in the report follow the UTC format (local time -2)

FINDINGS

- The runway in operation in Geneva was runway 05.
- (Ref. ATM-GE section ACC). By runway 05, arrivals via LTP are cleared by Marseille ACC to FL 160 (stable at LTP at the latest), released for descent between LTP and BELUS to FL 140, or stable at cruising level if this is lower than or equal to FL 160 (also released to FL 140). The traffic is transferred directly from Marseille Control to the Geneva APPROACH frequency.
- (Ref. ATM-GE section ACC). The INI sectors are responsible for IFR traffic flying outside the lateral and vertical limits of the approach sector.
- The two aircraft were being controlled by two different sectors of the Geneva control centre (Geneva ARRIVAL and INI South), on two different frequencies, inside Marseille Control airspace (ref: LoA TCG/LYON APP du 5.8.2004).
- The radar controller in charge of the Initial South INS sector was in possession of an appropriate control licence.
- The radar controller in charge of the INT ARRIVAL sector was in possession of an appropriate control licence.
- According to the ATIR report and the radar controllers' statements, the volume of traffic was light.
- At 18:31:57, the pilot of aircraft N83CP called the ARRIVAL radar sector on frequency 136.25 MHz, reporting his flight level FL 160. He was following arrival route RNAV STAR RWY 05 LTP 1N.
- LTP 1N: "La Tour-du-Pin One November Arrival: from LTP proceed via BELUS to CBY (IAF), then CBY NOVEMBER transition. MAX IAS 250 kt at LTP. Expect radar vectors to final APCH 05."
- According to the INFONET data, the VOR/DME de CBY (Chambéry) was out of service.
- At 18:32:06, the ARRIVAL radar controller identified aircraft N83CP and cleared it to point INDIS for a straight-in approach on runway 05, instructing it to maintain flight level FL 160.
- At 18:32:07, the pilot of aircraft AFR5825 called the Initial South radar sector of Geneva Radar on frequency 124.225 MHz.
- At 18:32:12, the INS radar controller identified aircraft AFR5825 and instructed it to maintain flight level FL 150, informing it that traffic was just above him. The pilot replied that he was maintaining flight level FL 150 on route PENAR – RISOR at a speed of 290 knots.
- At 18:32:16, the pilot of flight N83CP asked the ARRIVAL radar controller to repeat the point to which he was cleared, without mentioning the flight level.
- The ARRIVAL radar controller replied, giving a heading of 025 degrees. The pilot read back this clearance.
- At 18:32:27, the ARRIVAL radar controller issued essential traffic information to the pilot of aircraft N83CP: "traffic at your nine o'clock position, five miles, Southwest bound, correction, Southeast bound, is climbing one thousand feet below".
- At 18:32:34, the pilot of aircraft N83CP replied "Okay, we have contact with him".

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- At 18:32:38, the ARRIVAL radar controller confirmed to the pilot of aircraft N83CP that he should maintain flight level FL 160.
- The pilot of aircraft N83CP asked for confirmation as to whether he was to maintain flight level FL 160. The ARRIVAL radar controller confirmed this clearance.
- At 18:32:40, the short term conflict alert system (STCA) was triggered. According to the recording of the radar plots, the flight level of aircraft N83CP was FL 156 at 18:32:44.
- At 18:32:44, the INS radar controller issued essential traffic information to the pilot of aircraft AFR5825: "...traffic at your eleven o'clock, two miles, descending, follow your TCAS, please". The pilot replied that he was following his TCAS.
- At 18:32:48, the ARRIVAL radar controller telephoned the INS radar controller to report to him that it was his traffic and that it was supposed to be maintaining flight level FL 160. He added that he had issued traffic information.
- At 18:32:53, the ARRIVAL radar controller instructed the pilot of aircraft N83CP to climb immediately to flight level FL 160, informing him that the traffic was at his nine o'clock, at a distance of 1 NM. The pilot repeated "one six zero".
- The ARRIVAL radar controller asked the pilot of aircraft N83CP if he had the traffic in sight. The pilot replied that he was at flight level FL 160, adding "and Charlie Papa, responding to an RA".
- At 18:32:57, the INS radar controller informed the pilot of aircraft AFR5825 that he could climb at his discretion if he wished. The pilot replied: "negative, for the time being it was asking us to descend, you see."
- At 18:33:08, aircraft N83CP, which was following its TCAS resolution advisory, crossed in front of the perpendicular route of aircraft AFR5825, at a lateral separation of 1 NM and an altitude difference of 1500 ft.
- At 18:33:16, the pilot of aircraft AFR5825 announced: "Okay, in the final analysis we're staying at a hundred and fifty."
- At 18:33:31, the INS radar controller informed the pilot of aircraft AFR5825 that he "was clear of the traffic" and that he was cleared to climb to flight level FL 190. The pilot read back this clearance and added that he would be submitting an AIRPROX report.
- At 18:40:29, the ARRIVAL radar controller informed the pilot of aircraft N83CP that he was submitting a report on the incident, as was the pilot of the other aircraft involved.
- At 18:40:40, the ARRIVAL radar controller handed over aircraft N83CP to Geneva Control Tower on frequency 118.7 MHz.
- The incident took place at night under visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
- According to the radar plots, the minimum distance between the converging routes of the two aircraft was a lateral separation of 2.7 NM and an altitude difference of 400 ft.
- In his incident report, the commander of flight N83CP, who was pilot non flying (PNF) and responsible for communications with ATC, stated that he selected flight level FL 130 following an error in understanding the cleared flight level. He stated that when the aircraft passed FL 160 in descent, the controller reconfirmed the cleared flight level, i.e. flight level FL 160. At the same time, a TCAS alert (TA) was triggered, followed rapidly by a resolution advisory (RA). The copilot (PF pilot flying) stopped the descent at flight level FL 154 to climb back to flight level FL 160. They had the conflicting traffic in sight and estimated the lateral separation as 3 NM and the altitude difference as 500 ft.

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- Action by the air traffic controller in case of TCAS RA avoiding action reported by the flight crew (ref ATM-M section 7 General air traffic control):

  "Do not attempt to modify the aircraft flight path until the flight crew reports returning to the current ATC instruction or clearance;
  acknowledge the avoiding action and provide traffic information to aircraft affected by the manoeuvre.

  Once an aircraft has begun a manoeuvre in response to a TCAS RA, you cease to be responsible for providing separation between that aircraft and any other aircraft affected, or for any other possible consequences (e.g. loss of obstacle clearance or infringement of airspace) of such manoeuvre(s)."
- According to the commander's statements, the alarm occurred at 04.00 LT (New York). The incident occurred at 18:31 UTC, which corresponds to 14:31 LT (New York). He invokes the effect of the circadian cycle and the fatigue of the crew.
- Weather: ATIS GENEVE 1820Z ; Information DELTA

  Wind: 030 degrees, 9 KT, variable between 360 and 060 degrees

  Visibility: 10 KM

  Cloud: sparse 4000 FT

  Temperature: 15 °C

  QNH 1023 hPa

  No significant change

  Sunrise 04:39 Sunset 18:10

ANALYSIS

In the telephone conversation he had with the air traffic controller involved about an hour after the incident, the pilot of N83CP did not explain the inappropriate behaviour of the aircraft.

At the time of the initial radio contact with Geneva ARRIVAL, the route to point INDIS given by the radar controller apparently surprised the crew. The controller gave the following clearance: "proceed direct INDIS" ; "maintain one six zero for the time" as well as the information "for a straight in approach runway zero five". The instruction to maintain flight level 160 was not read back by the crew. The controller did not mention the term flight level in his instruction.

Clearly wishing to ensure efficiency and clarification, the controller then changed tactic and gave a heading to follow whilst issuing only one instruction at a time. After confirmation by the crew of the aircraft, he added essential traffic information "For your information, traffic at your nine o'clock position, ...". It seems that the pilots did not realise the importance and content of this information, since they continued their descent.

Having taken note of the latest weather information for the Geneva terminal region, the crew knew that the approach would be facing north-east, on runway 05. At flight level FL 160, the aircraft was a little high in relation to glide path 05 at approximately 47 NM from the threshold of runway 05. In these circumstances the information "for a straight in approach runway zero five" followed by the instruction to fly heading 025° could have been misinterpreted as a clearance to make the approach and therefore to descend. The surprise

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shown by the crew (18:32:42) when it was instructed for the second time to maintain flight level FL 160 corroborates this assumption.

TCAS situation

The conflicting convergence of N83CP and AFR5825 caused the issuing of corrective resolution advisories by the onboard collision avoidance systems of the two aircraft involved; their respective flight crews informed the radar controllers of the two air traffic control sectors concerned.
On the basis of the recording of the radar tracks, Eurocontrol's InCAS software tool was able to reconstruct the trajectories of the two aircraft and simulate the TCAS information provided onboard. The representations of the traffic advisories and resolution advisories are reliable, although their sequence may differ from the reality by a few seconds: this is due to the fact that the algorithm operations of the onboard collision avoidance systems follow a cycle which repeats a nominal rate of once a second, whereas the radar data have a longer refresh rate (4 seconds for the radar display). In order to analyse the conduct of the flight crews faced with ATC instructions and TCAS alerts, the latter are shown on a representation of the separations between the two aircraft, given as a function of time; this makes it easier to understand the dynamic of the conflict.

Aircraft N83CP

It clearly appears that the crew of aircraft N83CP stopped their descent only after the ATC instruction using urgent phraseology "climb immediately". The reaction to this instruction consisted of a very steep climb at a rate which may have reached 6000 ft minute, contrary to the maximum magnitude required by a corrective resolution advisory to climb. A simulation shows that the ideal vertical speed to follow would have been within the range 1500 – 2000 feet per minute. At the time the evasive manoeuvre was initiated, the onboard collision avoidance system only required a rate of climb not exceeding 300 feet per minute. The inappropriate follow-up to the TCAS instructions caused the crew of aircraft N83CP to exceed its allocated flight level by more than 1000 feet. It is probable that the aircraft crew over-reacted to the emergency phraseology term "immediately" used by the radar controller"... climb immediately to one six zero...". The need to climb seems to have assumed such importance that the TCAS instructions and levelling-off at flight level FL 160 were completely neglected.

Aircraft AF5825

The recordings of the radiotelephone calls reveal that the Air France crew neither reported nor made reference to establishing visual contact with the intruder. The pilot stated on the control frequency that his TCAS collision avoidance system was issuing a resolution advisory to descend but the recordings of the radar plots show no or very little variation in the flight level of the aircraft throughout the conflict. The only visible change is a very slight climb of 100 feet.

It clearly appears that the crew of flight AFR5825 followed neither the direction nor the magnitude of their resolution advisory issued by their TCAS.

This airprox incident shows the extent to which the indications of the onboard collision avoidance system must be understood, both "qualitatively" and "quantitatively".

All times indicated in the report follow the UTC format (local time -2)

Geneva Approach Control (ARRIVAL)

In the sequence of events during the incident and before STCA alarm was triggered, the radar controller made use of the maximum range of appropriate methods to facilitate the work of the crew of aircraft N83CP:

- He immediately gave them a heading to follow instead of spelling out point INDIS to which he had cleared them, after noting the pilot's hesitation.
- He issued them with essential traffic information concerning aircraft AFR5825 which was converging on their route 1000 feet below.
- He asked them several times to confirm that they were in fact maintaining flight level FL 160.

When the STCA alarm was activated, the ARRIVAL radar controller immediately telephoned the INS radar controller to inform him that he was in contact with the traffic and that the latter was supposed to be maintaining flight level FL 160. He then instructed the pilot of aircraft N83CP to climb immediately to flight level FL 160, issuing him with new essential traffic information.

It is clear that the crew of aircraft N83CP only stopped their descent following the urgent order given by the radar controller.

As the separation between the two aircraft continued to reduce, he gave them the instruction to climb back to flight level FL 160, using the emergency phraseology. He issued new essential traffic information to them and finally asked if they had visual contact with the conflicting traffic.

Geneva INI South control sector

At the time of the conflict, the two aircraft involved were in two different sectors of the control centre, on two specific frequencies. The INS radar controller who was handling flight AFR852 did not have the option of intervening directly on aircraft N83CP.

During the rapid evolution of the incident, the only margin of manoeuvre remaining to him, which he used, was to give the pilot of aircraft AFR5825 essential traffic information on the conflicting aircraft and to instruct him to follow the instructions of his TCAS.

According to his statement, the INS radar controller declared that he was attentive to the potential conflict between the two aircraft whilst applying the procedures in force inside this airspace.

Unaware of the level to which aircraft N83CP would descend, he even advised the pilot of aircraft AFR5825 that he could climb at his discretion, clearly indicating to him that there was no conflicting traffic above him.

CAUSE

The incident is due to the fact that the crew of aircraft N83CP left the flight level cleared by ATC. The crew invokes as the reason of this error the effect of the circadian cycle (time difference) and the fatigue.

All times indicated in the report follow the UTC format (local time -2)

Measures taken

Following this incident, a few initiatives introduced by the company operating the aircraft N83CP since the September 2004 include:

- Updated TCAS training to include specific techniques for return to assigned altitudes and to remain within the vertical velocity dictated by the resolution advisory.
- Training and standard operating procedure (SOP) focus on concise radio phraseology.
- Simulator training including operations at international airports frequented by their flight crews.
- Changes to SOP's to include specific calls and techniques when the flight crew is distracted or otherwise unable to confirm clearances through the normal check and balance.
- Enhanced awareness of fatigue and fatigue management.
- Improved departure, descent, and arrival briefings.
- Specific training from outside vendors in threat and error management with specific emphasis on communication on SOP compliance.
- Implementation of Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) and Procedural Intentional Non-Compliance (PINC) to measure SOP compliance and value

Berne, 23 Mai 2006 Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau

All times indicated in the report follow the UTC format (local time -2)

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONY

OR RADIOTELEPHONY COMMUNICATION TAPE-RECORDINGS

Investigation into the **incident** that occured on **16.09.2004**

- Subject of transcript:	**N83CP / AFR5825**
- Centre concerned:	Swiss Radar Area West
- Designation of unit:	Terminal Control Geneva, sector Arrival & INI South
- Frequency / Channel:	136.25 MHz & 124.225 MHz
- Date and period (UTC) covered by attached extract:	16.09.2004 18:31 - 19:39 UTC
- Date of transcript:	14 October 2004
- Name of official in charge of transcription:	Yannick BERTHET

- Certificate by official in charge of transcription:

I hereby certify:

- That the accompanying transcript of the telephony or radiotelephony communication tape-recordings, retained at the present time in the premises of the Analysis Department, has been made, examined and checked by me.
- That no changes have been made to the entries in columns 2, 3 and 4, which contain only clearly understood indications in their original form.

Geneva, 14 October 2004

Yannick BERTHET

Abbreviations

Sector		Designation of sector
PRE	-	Swiss Radar Area West, Terminal Control Geneva, sector Arrival
INS	-	Swiss Radar Area West, Terminal Control Geneva, sector INI South
DPC	-	Swiss Radar Area West, Terminal Control Geneva, Departure Coordinator Position

Aircraft	-	Callsign	Type of acft	Flight rules	ADEP	-	ADES
83CP	**-**	**N – 83CP**	**GLF5**	**IFR**	**KLGA**	**-**	**LSGG**
5825	**-**	***Air France 5825***	***CRJ1***	***IFR***	***LFLL***	**-**	***LIRF***
ONL	-	OE – GNL	LJ60	IFR	LIPO	-	LSGG

OGED / 14 October 2004

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: N83CP / AFR5825 of 16.09.2004

To Col.1	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
Frequency: 136.25 MHz, Geneva Arrival				
PRE	**83CP**	**18:31:57**	**Heu…, Swiss Control, November eight three Charlie Papa, one six… zero and we have… the information… Charlie.**	
83CP	**PRE**	**18:32:06**	**Bonjour, November eight three Charlie Papa…, roger, proceed direct INDIS for a straight in approach runway zero five, maintain one six zero for the time.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**16**	**Okay…, that was… cleared direct to…, say again the… point?**	
83CP	**PRE**	**23**	**Make it heading zero two five.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**25**	**Zero two five, Charlie Papa.**	
83CP	**PRE**	**27**	**For your information, traffic at your nine o'clock position, five miles, Southwest bound, correction, Southeast bound, is climbing one thousand feet below.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**34**	**Okay, we have contact with him, heu…, ????? Charlie Papa.**	Unreadable
83CP	**PRE**	**38**	**I confirm, maintain one six zero, Charlie Papa.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**42**	**Okay, maintain one six zero, confirm?**	
83CP	**PRE**	**44**	**Affirm, you're cleared one six zero, so maintain.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**50**	**Six zero, Charlie Papa.**	
83CP	**PRE**	**53**	**Charlie Papa, climb immediately to one six zero, the traffic is at your nine o'clock position, one mile.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**58**	**One six zero, Charlie Papa.**	
83CP	**PRE**	**18:33:00**	**Do you have it in sight?**	
PRE	**83CP**	**05**	**Charlie Papa is level one six zero.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**19**	**And Charlie Papa, XXXXX to an RA.**	Could be "respond"
83CP	**PRE**	**21**	**XXXXX.**	Probably "Of course"

Signature of person
in charge of transcription : YB

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: N83CP / AFR5825 of 16.09.2004

To Col.1	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
83CP	**PRE**	**18:34:01**	**November eight three Charlie Papa, cleared now to level one two zero.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**05**	**One two zero…, eight three Charlie Papa.**	
			_____	
				Sector in contact with : - BZ925RW
			_____	
83CP	**PRE**	**18:36:40**	**November three Charlie Papa, descend to flight level one hundred.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**44**	**Down one hundred…, eight three Charlie Papa.**	
			_____	
				Sector in contact with : - OEGNL
			_____	
83CP	**PRE**	**18:37:34**	**November eight three Charlie Papa, descend to altitude seven thousand feet, QNH one zero two three, on this heading intercept ILS zero five, cleared approach.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**42**	**We maintain… seven thousand, one zero two three, on this heading intercept the ILS zero five, eight three Charlie Papa.**	
			_____	
				Sector in contact with : - DAT 2721
			_____	
PRE	**83CP**	**18:40:09**	**And Swiss…, eight three Charlie Papa, request further descent.**	
83CP	**PRE**	**12**	**Eight three Charlie Papa, I confirm, cleared approach.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**15**	**Cleared approach, eight three Charlie Papa.**	
83CP	**PRE**	**29**	**Eight three Charlie Papa, for information, we will file a report about the incident and the pilot of the other aircraft involved as well.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**37**	**And… eight three Charlie Papa.**	

Signature of person
in charge of transcription : 

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: N83CP / AFR5825 of 16.09.2004

To Col.1	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
83CP	**PRE**	**18:40:40**	**Eight three Charlie Papa, call the Tower now, one one eight seven, au revoir.**	
PRE	**83CP**	**43**	**One one eight seven, Charlie Papa.**	

Frequency: 124.225 MHz, Swiss Radar, sector INI South

INS	***5825***	***18:32:07***	***Swiss…, bonjour, Air France… cinquante-huit vingt-cinq.***	
5825	***INS***	***12***	***Air France cinquante-huit vingt-cinq, bonsoir, maintenez niveau cent cinquante, trafic juste au-dessus de vous.***	
INS	***5825***	***17***	***On maintient le niveau cent cinquante…, PENAR – RISOR et deux cent quatre-vingt-dix nœuds.***	
5825	***INS***	***22***	***D'accord.***	
ONL	INS	23	Oscar Echo November Lima, descend to flight level one six zero.	
INS	ONL	26	Down to one six zero, Oscar November Lima.	
5825	***INS***	***44***	***Air France cinquante-huit vingt-cinq, y'a du trafic à votre onze heures, par deux miles, qui est en… descente, suivez votre TCAS, s'il vous plaît.***	
INS	***5825***	***51***	***XXXXX, on suit notre TCAS…, cinquante-huit vingt-cinq.***	Could be "Entendu"
5825	***INS***	***57***	***Cinquante-huit vingt-cinq, si vous voulez monter, vous pouvez monter à votre discrétion.***	
INS	***5825***	***18:33:01***	***Négatif, pour l'instant il nous demandait de descendre, hein.***	
5825	***INS***	***03***	***D'accord.***	
INS	***5825***	***09***	***Quel était le problème avec l'autre avion?***	
5825	***INS***	***11***	***Une erreur du pilote qui est passé au travers du niveau autorisé.***	

Signature of person
in charge of transcription : YB

TRANSCRIPT SHEET

Occurrence: N83CP / AFR5825 of 16.09.2004

To Col.1	From Col.2	Time Col.3	Communications Col.4	Observations Col.5
INS	***5825***	***18:33:16***	***Okay, nous en fin de compte on reste au cent cinquante.***	
5825	***INS***	***19***	***D'accord.***	
5825	***INS***	***31***	***France cinquante huit vingt-cinq, vous êtes dégagé du trafic, montez niveau… un neuf zéro, maintenant.***	
INS	***5825***	***36***	***Oui, cent quatre-vingt-dix, on souhaite déposer un Airprox.***	
5825	***INS***	***39***	***Heu…, certainement, on va… faire quelque chose ici, nous, nous aussi.***	
INS	***5825***	***43***	***Heu…, s'il vous plaît, oui, il est trente-deux, donc Airprox pour nous.***	
5825	***INS***	***47***	***D'accord.***	No additional remark is made on the incident any more

Signature of person
in charge of transcription : YB


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skyguide
LSE VOR/DME
AFR5825
N83CP
TOP270
ETA013
KOR240
BELUS
GIPNO
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+500 ft
144°
N
1 : 228,047
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NM 0 1 2 3 4
Name: Ivan Rochat Eval Date: 17.09.2004


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skyguide
148 18:32:32
149 18:32:36
149 18:32:40
149 18:32:44
149 18:32:48
149 18:32:52
149 18:32:56
150 18:33:00
149 18:33:04
149 18:33:08
149 18:33:12
149 18:33:16
149 18:33:20
149 18:33:24
148 18:33:28
149 18:33:32
149 18:33:36
261 N83CP 170 ETA013
171 18:33:36
171 18:33:32
171 18:33:28
170 18:33:24
170 18:33:20
168 18:33:16
167 18:33:12
164 18:33:08
160 18:33:04
155 18:33:00
153 18:32:56
153 18:32:52
155 18:32:48
156 18:32:44
156 18:32:40
158 18:32:36
159 18:32:32
160 18:32:28
160 18:32:24
1.6 NM -1100 ft 320°
2.2 NM -500 ft 324°
2.7 NM -400 ft 328°
3.3 NM -400 ft 331°
3.8 NM -600 ft 333°
4.3 NM -700 ft 335°
4.7 NM -700 ft 336°
5.1 NM -900 ft 338°
5.5 NM -1100 ft 340°
GIPNO
357 AFR5825 149 TOP270
220 TJT2216 240 PDU240
N
1 : 56,388
km 0 0.5 1
NM 0 0.5 1
Name: Yannick Berthet Eval Date: 08.10.2004