Pilot Handling Skills
Pilot Handling Skills
Definitions
Manual Flying Skills are considered pure core flying skills, where manoeuvres are flown solely by reference to raw data obtained from the heading, airspeed, attitude, altitude and vertical speed instruments, and without the use of technology such as autothrottles, autopilot, flight director, or any other flight management system. This might extend as far as requiring manual trim inputs and navigation using basic systems.
Pilot Handling Skills will include all the above manual flying skills, but may also relate to combinations of manual flying, speed and directional control together with combinations of automatic speed and direction control and guidance. Such combinations may occur through pilot preference, operational or procedural requirements, or when some automated systems are no longer functioning.
Whereas commercial airline pilots may once have been assessed wholly on their manual flying (aircraft handling) skills, nowadays pilot assessment is predominantly based on Systems and Crew Management, where management of the automated systems and maintenance of situational awareness replace many of the traditional flying skills.
Application
Pilots require handling skills in a variety of situations including:
- Visual approaches
- Circling approaches
- Instrument approaches (some precision and all non-precision)
- Landing
- Go-around
- Missed Approach
- Holding
- Reaction to ACAS/TAWS
- Recovery from unusual aircraft attitudes
- Rejected take-offs
- All phases of flight where aircraft flight control, management and navigation systems malfunctions dictate
Concerns
There are many arguments suggesting that commercial airline pilot handling (flying) skills have eroded with the advance of fly-by-wire, glass-cockpit, fully automated aircraft[1]. One could add to this the routine nature of many flight operations, the growth in controlled airspace and widespread availability of Instrument Landing Systems (ILS). Pilots flying with commercial airlines will typically fly manually only for the first and last few minutes of each flight. If a pilot logs 900 hours in a single year, fewer than 5 hours may involve manual flying. Also, more and more pilots flying today have never experienced an Industry where flying manually was, or is, the norm, unlike older pilots where these skills became “hard-wired”. This can further dilute the overall levels of pilot handling skills within an airline.
The majority of fatal, and non-fatal accidents, continue to occur during landing and go-around phases of flight[2], and loss of control (in-flight) continues to be the predominant category of fatal accidents[3]. Other areas of safety concern, for the industry, include unstabilised approaches, runway excursions, heavy landings, tail-scrapes[4][5], level-busts, and engine and airframe limit exceedance. Each of these phases of flight and accident categories (above) would appear to involve pilot handling skills. Whilst it would be wrong to identify lack of manual flying skills as the cause to all of these, especially where loss of situational awareness, system malfunction, environmental factors and poor Crew Resource Management (CRM) were involved, it nonetheless does indicate that effectively applied pilot handling skills may help prevent accidents and reduce the consequences of errors.
Therefore, any arguments suggesting that commercial airline pilot handling (flying) skills have become eroded should be examined seriously.
Automation
The increased sophistication and use of automation has improved safety by reducing the workload on pilots, allowing them greater capacity and time to make judgments and decisions as well as “manage” better the aircraft systems and crew. Pilots learn to fly (i.e. their core manual flying skills) by correcting aircraft flight parameters based on their predictions to a projected forward goal – i.e. straight and level flight, or touchdown. However, with multiple levels of automation and flight modes it is very difficult for pilots to predict what the consequences of various failures will be in every given situation. Part of the necessary response to automation failures is to apply manual flying (handling) skills[6]. Increased reliance on automation by flight crews has created a risk that crewmembers may no longer have the skills required to react appropriately to either failures in automation[1]. Therefore, operators should ensure that training programmes include means and standards to be met regarding the interaction of human performance and limitations with changes to the normal operation of the automation[7].
Training and Practice
Basic flying training is predominantly focused on manual handling and becoming proficient in core flying skills. By the time a pilot completes professional training the emphasis is on system and crew management. During a pilot’s professional career as a commercial airline pilot he/she will be required to demonstrate regularly proficiency in certain handling skills, and under certain conditions, i.e. conducting a safe take-off with the loss of one engine, or, flying an ILS approach to go-around at decision height, also with one engine inoperative.
It is important for airlines to monitor the skill levels of pilot handling, perhaps through flight data monitoring programmes and line flying and simulator observations; then to use this feedback to adjust training syllabi. It is also important for airlines to integrate automation use and degradation into training to reflect operational conditions involving manual handling skills – automation not just a theoretical subject.
It may be necessary to provide pilots with additional flight simulator training specifically aimed at addressing pilot handling skills deficiencies.
Accidents & Incidents
Events in the SKYbrary database which include Manual Handling as a contributory factor:
On 1 October 2022, a Boeing 737-800 first officer undergoing routine supervised training mishandled the touchdown at Nantes. The aircraft sustained substantial damage but there were no injuries. The potential consequences of an inexperienced first officer still undergoing line training attempting to land on the nonstandard runway profile at Nantes with little related coaching from the training captain were underestimated. The aircraft operator enhanced its management of line training, and a safety recommendation to improve operator awareness of Nantes’ nonstandard runway profile was made.
On 25 November 2022, a Boeing 737-800 landing at Kitchener/Waterloo Airport, Ontario, with the left thrust reverser inoperative overran the runway before stopping approximately 500 feet beyond the runway end. The captain had unintentionally selected the takeoff/go-around switch instead of disconnecting the autothrottles and then removed his hand from the left thrust lever to select reverse thrust on the right engine. The captain was experienced but new to type, and the first officer was a recently employed inexperienced pilot who had just completed his type rating. The left thrust reverser had been intermittently defective for the previous six months.
On 10 June 2024, a Dornier 228 impacted terrain near its destination in Malawi when it entered instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) when already operating in marginal visual flying conditions in daylight. The aircraft was destroyed and the three crew and six passengers on board were killed. The accident was attributed to the decision to continue flight at a low height over terrain, a lack of pilot situational awareness and inadequate pre-flight preparation. The passengers on the flight were civilians but the aircraft was owned by the Malawi Government and was operated by the Malawi Air Force.
On 31 October 2019, an Airbus Helicopters EC225LP departing a helipad at Dokdo, South Korea, at night crashed into the sea after the pilot became spatially disoriented and did not respond to alerts from both the travelling engineer and the copilot to the unintended descending flight path. All seven occupants were killed and the helicopter was destroyed. The absence of a departure briefing was assessed as contributory. However, findings on the underlying context for the accident involved procedural and training issues regarding the operational regime for emergency medical flights.
On 27 January 2023, a Boeing 777-319ER pilot delayed disconnecting the autopilot for a manual landing at Auckland until a very late stage and then did not replicate the roll input which had been provided by the autopilot to ensure the extended runway centreline was accurately tracked. As a consequence, the aircraft veered partly off the right side of the runway after touchdown and struck six runway edge lights before regaining the runway. The aircraft taxied to its assigned gate where tyre and brake assembly damage to the right main gear was found.
Further Reading
- Aircraft Loss of Control: Causal Factors and Mitigation Challenges, by S. R. Jacobson, NASA, 2010
References
- ^ a b Flight Safety Foundation Increased Reliance on Automation May Weaken Pilots’ Skills for Managing System Failures.
- ^ Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane Accidents 1959 – 2012
- ^ EASA Annual Safety Review 2012
- ^ Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note: Preventing Tailstrike at Landing.
- ^ Airbus Flight Operations briefing Note: Preventing Tailstrike at Takeoff.
- ^ A332, en-route, Atlantic Ocean, 2009
- ^ EASA Automation Policy: Bridging Design and Training Principles. Version of 14 January 2013.
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